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ABSTRACT 
EXAMINING A HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL OF 
OVERGENERAL MEMORY: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES, CAR-FA-X MODEL 
MECHANISMS, AND MEMORY ENCODING AS REPRESENTED BY COGNITIVE 
ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE  
 
by Carrie Adrian Davis 
 
 Overgeneral memory (OGM) is a phenomenon of reduced autobiographical memory 
specificity observed in major depressive disorder (MDD) and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). Individuals demonstrating OGM tend to describe past events generally 
rather than specifically recalling single memory occurrences. Research shows that OGM 
is perpetuated by three mechanisms: capture in the memory hierarchy due to trait 
rumination (CaR), functional avoidance of specific memory retrieval (FA), and impaired 
executive control (X), which together make up the CaR-FA-X model of OGM.  Research 
on the CaR-FA-X model has historically looked at each mechanism in isolation. The 
current research aimed to compare the contributions of all three mechanisms to a measure 
of OGM, as well as to investigate possible interactions between the mechanisms, and 
compare the contributions of the CaR-FA-X model to those of an encoding predictor. 
Psychometric data on the three CaR-FA-X mechanisms, autobiographical memory 
specificity, cognitive attributional style, and mental health were collected from 107 
undergraduate psychology students via online surveys, then analyzed in a hierarchical 
linear regression model. Executive control explained significant unique variance in 
OGM, with rumination making an indirect contribution. No other anticipated 
contributions from the CaR-FA-X model or memory encoding were observed.  
Methodological issues in non-clinical and computerized OGM research are highlighted.
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Introduction 
 Cognitive attributional style, sometimes called explanatory style, is the characteristic 
manner in which an individual explains the cause of self-relevant events. Put in simple 
terms, it describes the overall way in which a particular individual assigns meaning to the 
events in his or her life (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1990). Another construct of 
interest, overgeneral memory (OGM), relates to the specificity with which we recall the 
events that have happened to us (Williams, 2006). OGM occurs when we recall an event 
memory without sufficient detail to distinguish the memory as a single, specific instance 
– that is, the memory is too general. For example, if asked to recall a time when one was 
happy, one might respond by saying “I was happy last Saturday when I walked my dog in 
the park.” This would not be considered an OGM because the individual has given 
enough information to establish that his or her happy memory occurred at a single, 
definite point in time (i.e., last Saturday). If the individual had instead responded by 
saying “I am happy when I walk my dog,” it would have been considered an instance of 
OGM because the response does not contain specific enough information to distinguish a 
single point in time. The aim of the current study was to investigate the possible 
connection between the degree of specificity with which individuals habitually recall 
events in their lives (i.e., OGM) and how those individuals typically attribute meaning to 
the events in their lives (i.e., cognitive attributional style).  
 OGM is a phenomenon of reduced autobiographical memory specificity that has been 
associated with a number of mental illnesses (Boelen, Huntjens, & van den Hout, 2014; 
Ridout, Matharu, Sanders, & Wallis, 2015).  First observed in suicide attempters 
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(Williams & Broadbent, 1986), OGM has been most extensively linked to major 
depressive disorder (MDD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (e.g., Anderson, 
Goddard, & Powell, 2010; Ono, Devilly, & Shum, 2015; Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 
2010). The presence of OGM is thought to represent a potential risk factor for the 
development of both disorders (Bryant, Sutherland, & Guthrie, 2007; van Minnen, 
Wessel, Verhaak, & Smeenk, 2005). Further, OGM has been implicated in the 
maintenance of both MDD and PTSD, and has also been found to predict the course of 
both disorders (Boelen et al., 2014; Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Ono et 
al., 2015; Sumner et al., 2010).  
 In addition to being involved in the onset and maintenance of both disorders, OGM is 
associated with a number of skill deficits, including reduced social problem-solving 
abilities, poor ability to envision the future in a specific manner, and reduced ability to set 
specific, realistic goals, all of which point to poor outcomes in recovering from 
psychopathlogy (Belcher & Kangas, 2014; Boelen et al., 2014; Kaviani, Rahimi,  
Rahimi-Darabad, & Naghavi, 2011; Ridout et al., 2015). Conversely, training 
interventions aimed at improving memory specificity are associated with fewer 
depressive symptoms and decreased hopelessness, suggesting there may be a two-way 
relationship between OGM and the course of psychopathology (Raes, Willams, & 
Hermans, 2009; Serrano, Latorre, Gatz, & Montanes, 2004). 
The CaR-FA-X Model 
 The predominant model of OGM is Williams’ CaR-FA-X model (2007), and 
describes three primary mechanisms by which OGM acts: capture and rumination (CaR), 
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functional avoidance (FA), and impaired executive control (X). Together, these three 
mechanisms (CaR, FA, & X) comprise the CaR-FA-X model of OGM. Although all three 
mechanisms of the CaR-FA-X model have been studied independently in connection with 
OGM, there is no known interaction between the three mechanisms, and few studies have 
attempted to examine relationships between all three mechanisms (Sumner, 2012). 
Williams’ model has foundations in Conway & Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) self-memory 
model, specifically focusing on top-down, or generative, memory retrieval. In order to 
fully appreciate the implications of the CaR-FA-X model, it is necessary to first examine 
the self-memory model. 
 Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s self-memory model. According to Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model, generative retrieval involves an intentional staged search 
through a memory hierarchy, with the goal of retrieving information that matches the 
initial retrieval requirements. In the case of OGM studies, the information to be retrieved 
is a specific autobiographical memory, fitting the initial retrieval cue word, which is 
typically affective and strongly valenced (i.e., “happy” or “sad”). This top-down, 
generative method of memory retrieval occurs in response to either an internal or external 
request for information. This stands in contrast to bottom-up retrieval, which occurs 
spontaneously and unexpectedly and requires no conscious effort on the part of the 
person doing the remembering.  OGM is often measured using the autobiographical 
memory test (AMT), a 10-item prompt that uses affective keywords (e.g., “happy,” “sad,” 
etc.) to elicit autobiographical memory recall (Williams & Broadbent, 1986).  Response 
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coding for the AMT explicitly codes for memory specificity (i.e., general versus specific 
recall). 
 Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) have posited that the search process in generative 
retrieval uses abstract “general” descriptors to search through multiple levels of memory 
specificity, evaluate possible memory outputs, and verify that the generated output 
matches the initial retrieval specifications. As such, these general descriptors are central 
to the generative retrieval process. In OGM, it is thought that a general descriptor used in 
the memory search is returned instead of an actual specific memory, thus leading to the 
lack of autobiographical memory specificity observed in OGM. 
 Such failure to return a specific memory represents a failure of the generative search, 
called a “dysfacilitation of the retrieval process,” or aborted search. An aborted memory 
search terminated in the very first stages of retrieval may cause the person remembering 
to either fail to give a response at all (called an “omission”) or else return a semantic 
associate of the retrieval cue. Later preemptive termination would result in the retrieval of 
an intermediate general descriptor that would normally be used to guide the retrieval 
process. Two kinds of general descriptor “memories” have been described in the OGM 
literature. A “categorical” memory is one that describes a class of events (i.e., “when I go 
to the gym”) as opposed to a single specific event. By contrast, an “extended” memory is 
one that describes a series of events that occurred in close temporal proximity to one 
another, but occurred across more than one day (i.e., “my vacation in Rome”; Williams et 
al., 1996).  
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 According to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model, a highly elaborated, 
interconnected network of intermediate general descriptors begins to form if generative 
searches are repeatedly aborted. This decreases the likelihood of accessing a specific 
memory for a given retrieval cue. The OGM phenomenon itself is thought to be caused 
by this aborted generative search process, while the mechanisms that are thought to cause 
the aborted search are related to cognitive processing, coping, and resource deficits that 
have been observed in both MDD and PTSD (Honzel, Justus, & Swick, 2014; Michl, 
McLaughlin, Shepherd, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013). The CaR-FA-X model describes 
these deficits. 
 Capture and Rumination (CaR). According to Williams’ (2006) CaR-FA-X model 
of OGM, an individual may become “captured” at the level of intermediate general 
descriptors during a generative retrieval search. This phenomenon is called “mnemonic 
interlock” and evidence shows that this is more likely to occur when a retrieval cue 
activates an individual’s long-term beliefs, attitudes, and concerns (Spinhoven, Bockting, 
Kremers, Schene, & Williams, 2007). When an individual is captured in mnemonic 
interlock, they cannot move to a deeper level of memory hierarchy, and thus cannot move 
past the general level at which they are captured, so they instead bounce between related 
descriptors at that level. This capture then triggers ruminative thinking. Rumination is the 
repeated focus on feelings of distress, with an emphasis on analyzing the causes and 
consequences of that distress as opposed to finding solutions to decrease the negative 
emotion (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Take for example someone 
who has failed a test for an important class. If the individual responded by ruminating 
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about this event, he or she might think over and over again about how bad he or she feels 
for failing the test. He or she might contemplate the reasons why he or she failed the test, 
attempting to dissect all of the factors that contributed to his or her failure. He or she 
might also think about how he or she will definitely fail the class now because he or she 
failed the test. Without searching for solutions to the problem (i.e., how to pass the next 
test), this line of thinking will only intensify his or her distress, leading to a cycle of 
increased analytical processing and distress amplification. This is rumination. 
 Rumination keeps the individual in mnemonic interlock by repeatedly activating the 
intermediate descriptors at the captured level in an attempt to analyze issues related to the 
individual’s concerns, as triggered by the cue word. Theoretically, this would strengthen 
the connections between the intermediate descriptors, thereby further elaborating the 
network at the intermediate hierarchy levels and increasing the likelihood that OGM 
recall will occur again. 
 Studies of rumination in connection with OGM support the CaR hypothesis of the 
CaR-FA-X model. Measures of trait rumination correlate with the probability of 
retrieving a specific memory, with higher levels of rumination predicting fewer specific 
memories (e.g., Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2011).  Further, induced ruminative 
processing has been linked to increased OGM (Sutherland & Bryant, 2007) while 
induced sensory experience (i.e., non-ruminative) processing has been found to reduce 
OGM in non-clinical samples (Raes, Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008). This 
suggests a causal relationship between rumination and OGM. The relationship may be  
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bi-directional, as induction of a non-specific memory retrieval style has also been 
associated with increased rumination (Raes, Hermans, Williams, Geypen, & Eelen, 
2006). It can be tempting to explain the connection between rumination and OGM as the 
byproduct of a third variable relationship with MDD, but levels of trait rumination have 
been found to account for differences in ability to recall specific memories even when 
controlling for depressive symptoms (e.g., Wessel et al., 2014).  
 The role of rumination in OGM, and thus in the explanatory CaR-FA-X model, is 
supported by mnemonic interlock theory. Sumner et al. (2011) found that high ruminators 
are less likely to retrieve a specific memory than low ruminators when a cue was low on  
self-relevance. The same relationship did not hold true for cues high on self-relevance, 
suggesting that people with a high tendency to ruminate are more easily captured by 
mnemonic interlock. In high ruminators, cues with both higher and lower relevance to 
their personal concerns activated the rumination process, whereas all individuals are 
likely to ruminate when cues are highly relevant to their concerns (Crane, Barnhofer, & 
Williams, 2007). 
 Some studies have found further connections between OGM and the subcomponents 
of rumination: reflection and brooding. Reflection refers to purposeful internal thought 
directed at alleviating depressive symptoms, while brooding is defined as “a passive 
comparison of one’s current situation with some unachieved standard” (Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Some evidence suggests that reflection plays a 
‘healthy’ role in recovering from MDD, whereas brooding represents a possible risk 
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factor for mood-related psychopathology (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Joorman, Dkane, & 
Gotlib, 2006). 
 When looking at the reflection component of rumination, Wessel and colleagues 
(2014) found that higher levels of reflection were related to a higher tendency to retrieve 
specific positive memories in individuals with remitted depression, even when 
controlling for current depressive symptoms. Schoofs, Hermans, Griffith, and Raes 
(2013) found the opposite, with the number of specific memories recalled decreasing as 
the level of reflection increased following a self-discrepant thinking induction, suggesting 
that reflection, commonly known as the adaptive component of rumination, could 
actually be harmful when aimed at resolving self-discrepancies. Still other studies have 
found no connection between reflection and OGM (Romero, Vasquez, & Sanchez, 2014). 
 In examining the role of brooding and OGM, Wessel and colleagues (2014) found no 
connection between brooding and OGM in remitted depressives, while Romero et al. 
(2014) found the opposite: a higher level of brooding predicts retrieval of fewer specific 
positive memories. The majority of studies that report a connection between reflection 
and OGM have not found a relationship between brooding and OGM, and vice versa 
(Romero et al., 2014; Schoofs et al., 2013; Wessel et al., 2014).   
 Functional Avoidance (FA). The second component of the CaR-FA-X model, 
functional avoidance, describes a tendency for those demonstrating OGM to evade 
emotional distress by recalling memories with reduced specificity. For example, someone 
who witnessed a bomb explosion might exhibit FA in order to bypass the distress that 
accompanies those memories. When asked about the explosion, this person might 
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respond by simply saying “It was loud,” when in fact they are actually able to remember 
what they were wearing, what they were doing, their thoughts right before the bomb went 
off, as well as who they saw injured during and immediately after the blast. By avoiding 
thinking about these details and instead giving a generalized response, this person avoids 
the emotional distress associated with the bomb going off, and thus is exhibiting FA.  
 Williams (2006) suggests that FA develops through a developmentally learned 
association between greater emotional distress and greater memory specificity. This is 
consistent with findings that children with a more specific memory recall style tend to be 
more emotion-focused, and that individuals with this same style experience greater mood 
disturbance following induced frustration (Drummond, Dritschel, Astell, O’Carroll, & 
Dalgleish, 2006; Raes, Hermans, de Decker, Eelen, & Williams, 2003). In Williams’ 
view, this learned association between distress and memory specificity leads to 
subsequent development of FA in those that later experience depression or trauma 
(2006).  
 FA is thought to begin as avoidance of specific recall of trauma-related memories, 
which later develops into an overall overgeneral retrieval style (i.e., OGM) through 
repeated reinforcement (Williams et al., 2007). According to CaR-FA-X model theory, 
FA may be maintained through a “gating mechanism” that fights to keep negative 
specific memories out of consciousness by blocking recall of those specific memories 
(Williams, 2006). As a result, the level of intermediate descriptors is the deepest level of 
memory retrieval that can easily be accessed, thus leading to increased retrieval of 
categoric memories in individuals displaying this FA. 
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 The FA hypothesis goes one step further in explaining the memory disturbances 
observed in PTSD. It posits that when both FA and reduced executive control (the “X” 
piece of the CaR-FA-X model) are present, an individual should experience faster output 
of memories through bottom-up retrieval. These memories would likely be negative 
specific memories that the individual has been fighting to keep out of conscious 
awareness through the FA gating mechanism, but cannot any longer due to impaired 
executive control. The phenomenological result, then, may be the involuntary, 
spontaneous, intrusive recall of negative memories experienced by an individual with 
PTSD when triggered. Indeed, there is a higher tendency for individuals with PTSD to 
recall a higher number of negative general memories than positive ones in OGM, 
suggesting that the retrieval of general memories may act as that gating mechanism to 
allow the individual to avoid painful specific memories (Ono et al., 2015). Similarly, 
individuals with adult trauma have shown a tendency to respond to threat cue words with 
higher levels of OGM, suggesting that FA may be at play in reducing the potential for 
involuntary recall of specific memories associated with the threat cue (Ono & Devilly, 
2013). 
 As expected, measures of avoidant coping and cognitive avoidance strategies 
correlate with the probability of recalling a specific memory on measures of OGM 
(Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006; Wessel et al., 2014). Further, the association between level of 
OGM and degree of FA stands independent of the association between OGM and MDD, 
with an increase in categoric recall immediately following an acute stress induction 
positively correlating with higher levels of cognitive avoidant coping in a non-clinical 
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sample, even after controlling for depressive symptoms (Debeer, Raes, Claes, Vrieze, 
Williams, & Hermans, 2012). This suggests that acute stress may spontaneously activate 
the FA mechanism through X (i.e., impaired executive control). In contrast to the 
association between categoric recall association and spontaneous activation of FA, 
intentional conscious suppression of specific memories is related to an increase in the 
number of extended memories recalled in response to word probes (Stephens, Braid, & 
Hertel, 2013). Since categoric recall is the typical form of OGM observed in studies of 
both MDD and PTSD (Ono et al., 2015), this suggests that the FA mechanism may 
operate outside of conscious awareness, independent of the individual’s control. 
 Lending further support to the idea that FA may subconsciously block retrieval of 
potentially painful memories through categoric recall is the previously discussed finding 
by Schoofs et al. (2013) that the number of specific memories recalled following a 
self-discrepant thinking induction decreased as an individual’s level of reflection 
increased, while number of categoric memories recalled increased. This suggests that 
individuals engaging in self-discrepant thinking may be subconsciously avoiding 
generating specific examples of those self-discrepancies, particularly in cases where 
reflection might make those examples more easily accessible. 
 Impaired eXecutive control (X). Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model 
suggests that generative retrieval requires a high degree of executive control to guide the 
search process. Executive control refers to the cognitive processes that allow for  
goal-directed action, such as planning, monitoring, and inhibiting irrelevant information 
from interfering with the task at hand (e.g., Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). 
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Executive control consists of three core components: inhibitory control, cognitive 
flexibility, and updating working memory (Miyake et al., 2000). Inhibitory control 
includes response inhibition (i.e., impulse control) and cognitive inhibition, while 
cognitive flexibility refers to task-switching (e.g., unconsciously switching attention 
between changing the music on one’s phone and driving) and mental set-shifting (e.g., 
when editing a paper, switching from thinking that the problems one needs to fix are 
grammatical, to thinking that they are content-related) and is closely related to creativity. 
Working memory describes a component of short-term memory responsible for holding 
information used in current processing and cognitive tasks. 
 All three components of executive control may be explicitly involved in the strategic 
memory search process (Sumner, 2012). Inhibition, the ability to focus on relevant 
stimuli while filtering out irrelevant ones, is necessary for ignoring information not 
related to the memory search task. Inhibition is also important in guiding the search 
process toward memories that fit the retrieval specifications. Working memory is 
necessary for holding the retrieval specifications and instructions to recall a “specific” 
memory in mind while conducting the search process. Verbal fluency, which involves 
cognitive flexibility, encompasses cognitive processes necessary for information and 
memory retrieval, such as selective attention, mental set-shifting, internal response 
generation, and self-monitoring (Patterson, 2011, p. 2603), and reflects the ability to 
organize retrieval, initiate and maintain a search set, and inhibit inappropriate responses 
(Swan & Carmelli, 2002). Clearly, without these processes, a strategic memory search 
would be difficult, if not impossible. Thus, the CaR-FA-X model suggests that 
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insufficient executive control may lead to an aborted search, and, in turn, OGM. This is 
consistent with the long-standing notion that individuals with MDD show poor memory 
because of a general lack of cognitive resources (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hertel & 
Hardin, 1990). The expectation according to the CaR-FA-X model, then, is that reduced 
executive control will result in slower generative retrieval and increased categoric recall 
due to early search termination (Williams, 2006).  
 Consistent with this expectation are findings that point to slower retrieval of positive 
memories in those with MDD (Ridout, Dritschel, Matthews, & O’Carroll, 2016). 
Additionally, evidence shows that higher scores on measures of executive control are 
positively related to the probability of recalling a specific memory (Sumner et al., 2011). 
This complements the finding that depletion of executive control through completion of 
the Stroop color word task resulted in retrieval of fewer specific memories and more 
categoric memories, even when depression levels were held constant (Neshat-Doost, 
Dalgleish, & Golden, 2008).  
 Although impaired executive control clearly contributes to the occurrence of OGM, 
the relationship between specific components of executive control and OGM is unclear. 
Raes, Verstraeten, Bjittebier, Vasey, & Dalgleish (2010) found that inhibitory control, 
mediated the relationship between MDD and OGM. Another study examining shifting, 
verbal fluency, and inhibition, provided evidence that category fluency – a facet of verbal 
fluency – was found to be the only component associated with OGM (Valentino, 
Bridgett, Hayden, & Nuttall, 2012). Evidence links higher levels of OGM to lower 
cognitive inhibition (Raes et al., 2010), working memory capacity (Neshat-Doost et al., 
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2008), and verbal fluency (Heeren, Van Broeck, & Philippot, 2009), however, 
associations are not consistent across studies (Sumner, 2012). Compounding the issue 
further is the general lack of studies examining specific components of executive control 
and inconsistent operationalization of executive control components in OGM studies.  
Autobiographical Memory Encoding and OGM 
 Although Williams’ (2006) CaR-FA-X model offers an elegant explanation of the 
potential mechanisms that underlie OGM, it may not comprehensively account for all of 
the factors influencing OGM, as a number of findings in the literature point to 
phenomena outside of the explanatory scope of the CaR-FA-X model (e.g. the role of 
reduced goal specificity in contributing to OGM [Belcher & Kangas, 2014]; the role of 
somatic distress and self-esteem on OGM [Kashdan, Roberts, & Carlos, 2006]; the role of 
expressive writing as a protective factor against OGM [Maestas & Rude, 2012]; the 
relationship between maternal reminiscing style and child’s autobiographical memory 
specificity [Valentino et al., 2014]). Most notably, the finding that the temporal 
remoteness of an event is associated with the probability that the memory of the event 
will be recalled specifically rather than overgenerally, even when accounting for  
CaR-FA-X variables, suggests that mechanisms affecting retrieval may not be the only 
ones at play in perpetuating OGM (Falco, Peynircioglu, & Hohman, 2015). Factors 
affecting memory encoding may also influence overgeneral recall, although 
comparatively less research has been completed in regards to the relationship between 
encoding and OGM, as it is assumed that OGM is the result of a retrieval deficit 
(Williams, 2006). 
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 The current study aims to address this gap in the research by examining cognitive 
attributional style, and thus an individual’s style of interpreting and encoding event 
memories, in connection with CaR-FA-X model mechanisms and autobiographical 
memory specificity. The idea behind examining cognitive attributional style is that OGM 
is perpetuated via repetitive activation of intermediate descriptors during memory 
retrieval (Williams, 2006). Retrieval of an event memory not only makes use of objective 
descriptors (i.e., “hanging out with my dad last Sunday”) to find the target memory, but 
also subjectively assigned meanings attributed to the memories during encoding or 
subsequent remembering (i.e., “hanging out with my dad last Sunday made me happy”). 
Thus, the attributed meanings of remembered events likely play a role in generative 
retrieval. Otherwise, it would be impossible to index and search memories by affective 
retrieval cue.  
 This suggests that the manner in which an event is encoded may influence the 
specificity of subsequent retrieval. Specifically, if an individual displays a tendency to 
attribute meanings to events in a global, stable, internally focused manner as opposed to a 
specific, unstable, externally focused manner, that individual’s event memories may be 
encoded simply as evidence for long-standing general opinions or categoric descriptor 
statements (e.g., “spending time alone never makes me happy”), as opposed to a specific 
incident exhibiting those characteristics (e.g., “I was unhappy spending time alone 
today”). If event memories are encoded as categoric descriptor statements, it may, in turn, 
increase the likelihood that those memories are recalled in a categoric, as opposed, to 
specific, manner. 
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 The finding that negative event cue words elicit fewer specific responses than 
negative affective cue words in individuals displaying dysphoria (Rekart, Mineka, & 
Zinbarg, 2006) supports the assertion that categoric encoding may play a part in 
perpetuating OGM, as it would be easier to recall a specific memory from an affective 
descriptor cue than from an event cue if negative memories are encoded categorically in 
individuals experiencing emotional distress. Evidence also suggests that people with 
MDD describe life events and time periods with increased coherence and repetition of 
negative information, whereas individuals with no MDD experience display the opposite 
pattern (Dalgliesh, Hill, Golden, Morant, & Dunn, 2011), further suggesting that 
encoding in OGM may involve sorting memories according to pre-established negative 
descriptor themes, which would then guide subsequent retrieval. 
 Cognitive attributional style refers to the way in which individuals interpret and 
assign meaning to personal life events, and thus may influence the way in which events 
are encoded and subsequently remembered. The construct consists of three dimensions 
which together make up attributional style: internality, stability, and globality. Internality 
refers to the extent to which an individual interprets an event as being due to his or her 
own actions (e.g., “I dropped my lunch because I am clumsy” versus “I dropped my 
lunch because someone bumped into me”). Stability describes the extent to which the 
attributed cause for a given event will continue to affect the individual in the future (e.g., 
“I will always be clumsy, so I will probably drop my lunch again in the future” versus “I 
was clumsy because I was tired this morning, so I will not likely drop my lunch again in 
the future.”) Finally, globality refers to the overall generalizability of the attributed cause 
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to other domains of life (e.g., “Being clumsy also causes me to trip, knock things over, 
create messes, and generally live in a disorganized, embarrassed state” versus “Being 
clumsy just causes me to drop things”). 
 Cognitive attributional style has been linked to MDD in learned helplessness theory, 
such that an internal, stable, global attibutional style for negative events (i.e., pessimistic 
style) is associated with vulnerability toward developing MDD (Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978). An external, unstable, specific attributional style for negative events 
(i.e., optimistic style) has also been shown to play a role in protecting against MDD 
relapse when combined with attributional flexibility (Moore, Fresco, Schumm, & 
Dobson, 2017). Further, an internal, stable, global style for positive events has been 
linked to decreased depressive symptoms in adolescents (Rueger & George, 2017) and 
resilience in the face of failure (Johnson, Panagioti, Bass, Ramsey, & Harrison, 2017). 
Thus, it stands to reason that cognitive attributional style may be linked to OGM as a 
factor influencing memory encoding and subsequent retrieval by determining a subset of 
retrieval cues associated with event memories, particularly memories of strong emotional 
valence. 
Research Questions 
 The current study aims to examine the connection between the CaR-FA-X model 
variables, cognitive attributional style, and OGM. In particular:  
1) Do each of the individual CaR-FA-X model mechanisms contribute 
significant unique variance to a measure of OGM (as measured by the 
AMT)?  
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2) Does the CaR-FA-X model as a whole contribute significant additional 
unique variance to AMT performance over and above the variance 
accounted for by the individual CaR-FA-X elements independently (as 
measured by the inclusion of the three two-way and the one three-way 
interaction terms)? 
3) Does cognitive attribution account for unique variability in AMT 
performance not captured by the CaR-FA-X model? 
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Method 
Participants 
 The participants in this study were 107 undergraduate San Jose State University 
psychology students between the ages of 18 and 26 (M = 19.43, SD = 1.55). The sample 
characteristics are shown in Table 1. The sample included slightly more males than 
females, with 56.07% of the sample identifying as female and 43.92% identifying as 
male. No students identified as transgender. All participants responded to gender 
identification question. 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics – Gender and Ethnicity (N = 107) 
Demographic Characteristics N Percentage 
Gender   
Female 60 56.07% 
Male 47 43.92% 
Ethnicity   
Hispanic 41 38.32% 
Asian/Pacific Islander 40 37.38% 
Caucasian 16 14.95% 
African-American 5 4.67% 
Middle Eastern 1 .93% 
Native American 1 .93% 
Other 3 2.8% 
 
Note. N = Number of participants in the total sample. n = Number of participants that 
identified with the given group. Transgender option offered, although no participants 
identified as such. 
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 The sample was ethnically diverse, reflecting the composition of San Jose State 
University, with 38% of participants identifying as Hispanic, 37.4% identifying as Asian 
or Pacific Islander, and 15.0% identifying as Caucasian. African-American participants 
comprised 4.7% of the sample, while Middle Eastern and Native American participants 
each made up 0.9% of the sample. A small portion of the participants (2.8%) identified as 
“other.” 
Target Variables and Psychometrics 
 Autobiographical memory specificity. Autobiographical memory specificity was 
measured in terms of the number of general versus specific memories recalled, with 
general memories being coded according to type (i.e., categoric, extended, semantic 
association, or omission). Autobiographical memory specificity was assessed using a 
computerized version of the AMT. The AMT is the standard assessment procedure used 
in the vast majority of OGM and autobiographical memory specificity studies (Debeer, 
Hermans, & Raes, 2009; Debeer et al., 2012; Heeren et al., 2009; Hitchcock, Nixon, & 
Weber, 2014; Neshat-Doost et al., 2008; Ono & Devilly, 2013; Ridout et al., 2016; 
Schoofs et al., 2013; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008; Valentino et al., 2012; Wessel et al., 
2014). The standard version of the AMT is administered orally and uses five negatively 
and five positively valenced affective words to probe participants for a “specific 
memory” (i.e., a memory of one event that occurred one time, over the space of no more 
than one day). Participants typically have 30 seconds to verbally give their response to 
each cue word, and are clearly instructed to be specific in recalling events (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986).  
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 The version of the AMT used in this study was administered online, using typed 
responses to increase ease and accessibility of study participation and scoring, as well as 
to eliminate any potential Rosenthal effects. Participants were still given 30 seconds to 
provide a response to each cue word, as in the standard version of the AMT. A 
computerized version of the AMT has been shown to replicate the OGM effect, albeit, 
without the usual time limit employed in most AMT administrations (Rekart et al., 2006). 
Additionally, pilot study data comparing the standard AMT to the online administration 
showed no significant differences between the two test formats. As in Williams & 
Broadbent (1986), the five positively valenced cue words were “happy,” “safe,” 
“interested,” “successful,” and “surprised,” while the five negatively valenced cue words 
were “sad,” “angry,” “hurt (emotionally),” “clumsy,” and “lonely.”  
 The minimal instructions version of the AMT (α = .53) used in the current study 
differs from the original implementation by omitting the instruction to be specific 
(Griffith, Sumner, Raes, Barnhofer, Debeer, & Hermans, 2012). Debeer et al. (2009) 
suggests that the minimal instruction version may be more sensitive to detecting OGM in 
sub- and non-clinical populations. Since it was expected that there would be a minimal 
number of participants with a history of MDD and/or PTSD diagnosis in the sample, the 
minimal instructions version of the AMT used in the current study included only 
instructions to recall a memory in connection with the cue word, with no mention of 
specificity; the instruction to “be specific” was omitted (Debeer, et al., 2009).  
 The AMT cue words were shown in an alternating order, with each positively 
valenced word presentation followed by a negatively valenced word. Cue words 
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continued in this alternating order until participants had responded to all 10 cue words. 
Participants were given 30 seconds to type responses to each cue word, and were 
automatically advanced to a blank screen at the end of 30 seconds. Participants were then 
instructed to push a button to advance to the next screen when they were ready for the 
next cue word.  
 All responses to the AMT were de-identified, separated from all predictor variable 
data, compiled into one spreadsheet, and distributed to a research assistant trained in 
AMT coding. To score the AMT, the investigator and one research assistant 
independently read each participant’s response to determine specificity (see Table 2). 
Each response was coded as “specific” (clearly occurring one time, on one day only), 
“categorical” (a series, or repetition, of events), “extended” (occurring on more than one 
day), “semantic association” (a reference to a person, place, or thing without any event or 
temporal context), or “omission” (no response) according to clearly outlined coding 
guidelines (Ono & Devilly, 2013; Schoofs et al., 2013; Wessel et al., 2014). The 
investigator and the research assistant discussed any items that did not clearly fit into one 
of the five codes, and mutually determined appropriate coding for such items. Only 
responses that clearly indicated that the referenced event occurred one time, on one 
specific day were rated as “specific.” Thus none of the disputed responses were rated as 
“specific.” For examples of participant responses and correspondent rating categories, see 
Table 2. 
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Table 2 
 
Definitions and Examples of AMT Memory Response Types 
 
Memory Type Definition Example 
1. Specific Clearly occurring one time, on one day. “Meeting my 
boyfriend on 
the first day of 
my current 
job.” 
 
2. Categorical A series or class of recurring events. “When I 
disappoint my 
mom.” 
 
3. Extended Occurring on more than one day. “When 
someone got in 
an argument 
with me and 
ran away for 
four days.” 
 
4. Semantic 
Association 
A reference to a person, place, or thing 
without temporal context. 
 
“My dad.” 
5. Omission No response, or a response devoid of 
content. 
 
“I can’t 
remember.” 
 
Note. All definitions drawn from Williams and Broadbent (1986). All examples taken 
from participant responses. 
 
 Inter-rater reliability was calculated for both Williams and Broadbent’s (1986) 
standard five-category coding scheme as described above, as well as for a simplified  
two-category coding scheme which reflects a recent trend of examining memory 
specificity in OGM research (Schoofs et al., 2013; Sumner et al., 2011; Sumner et al., 
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2014; Wessel et al., 2014).  In this two-category scheme, the number of participant 
responses coded as “specific” were compared to all four other memory categories, which 
were combined into one category and labeled “not specific.” This second, binary coding 
scheme was examined because memory specificity (i.e., whether or not a participant’s 
response fit the criteria for a “specific” memory) will be the criterion variable in the 
study’s main analysis, and will be measured only in terms of the number of specific 
memories recalled by participants (see Table 4). The standard five-category coding 
scheme was included for construct validity. 
 Cognitive attributional style. Cognitive attributional style was measured in terms of 
the three attributional style dimensions: internality, stability, and globality. Attributional 
style was included in the analysis as three separate style dimensions, rather than by 
combining the three dimensions into a single style type. Cognitive attributional style was 
assessed using a computerized version of the attributional style questionnaire (ASQ; 
Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora, & Peterson, 1996). The ASQ is a self-report measure in 
which participants were given 12 simple, hypothetical situations followed by three 
questions each for a total of 36 questions. For each situation, participants were instructed 
to think about that situation happening to them, and then type the most probable major 
cause of the situation. Participants then answered three questions about each cause using 
an eleven-point Likert scale, with each question contributing to one of three subscales: 
internality, stability, and globality.  
 The internality subscale (α = .70) assesses the extent to which the cause is due to the 
participant or another person/circumstance, and is measured on a scale of 0 (“Totally due 
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to other people or circumstances”) to 10 (“Totally due to me”). The stability subscale (α 
= .81) examines the extent to which the given cause will be present in the future. Stability 
is measured on a scale of 0 (“Will never again be present”) to 10 (“Will always be 
present”). Finally, the globality subscale (α = .74) assesses the extent to which a given 
cause applies to other situations beyond the given event. Globality is measured on a scale 
of 0 (“Influences just this particular area”) to 10 (“Influences all situations in my life”). 
All ASQ subscale scores were calculated by averaging within-subject single-item 
response scores for each participant. 
 CaR-FA-X model variables. In order to examine the relationship between cognitive 
attributional style, OGM, and the associated CaR-FA-X mechanisms, participants 
completed measures assessing all three components of the CaR-FA-X model.  
 Capture and rumination (CaR). To examine the CaR mechanism, operationalized as 
trait rumination, participants completed a computerized version of the ruminative 
responses scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The RRS is the standard 
instrument used to assess rumination in the majority of OGM studies (Debeer et al., 2009; 
Romero et al., 2014; Schoofs et al., 2013; Sumner et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2014). The 
RRS is 22-item scale that assesses an individual’s typical response to negative mood in 
terms of behavioral focus on self, symptoms of negative mood, and the consequences of 
those symptoms (α = .90). In addition to assessing overall ruminative tendencies, the 
scale also addresses two facets of rumination, reflection (α = .72) and brooding (α = .77). 
Participants responded to each question by rating each behavior on a Likert scale of 1 
(“almost never”) to 4 (“almost always”). RRS and subscale scores were calculated by 
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were calculated by averaging within-subject single-item response scores for each 
participant. 
 The brooding and reflection subscales do not additively comprise the whole RRS, 
rather, each subscale includes questions that address either sub-facet of rumination, while 
the remainder of the RRS assesses general rumination. An initial analysis included the 
brooding and reflection subscales in the hierarchical multiple regression, however, 
neither subscale score contributed significantly to the overall model. To reduce  
multi-collinearity, brooding and reflection subscale scores were thus not included in the 
final regression.  
 Functional avoidance (FA). To assess FA, operationalized as avoidant coping, 
participants completed a computerized version of the escape-avoidance subscale (α = .72) 
of the ways of coping questionnaire (WAYS; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). The WAYS 
assesses the thoughts and actions that participants use to cope with life stresses, with the 
escape-avoidance subscale specifically focusing on wishful thinking and  
cognitive-behavioral efforts to avoid stressors. The escape-avoidance subscale consists of 
8 items, rated on a four-point Likert scale from 0 (“Does not apply or not used”) to 3 
(“Used a great deal”).  WAYS escape-avoidance subscale scores were calculated by 
averaging within-subject single-item response scores for each participant. 
 Impaired executive control (X). To examine the X mechanism, operationalized as 
verbal fluency, participants completed the controlled oral word association task 
(COWAT; Strauss et al., 2006). The COWAT is a measure of verbal fluency and has 
been shown to relate to autobiographical memory specificity as a measure of executive 
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control in OGM studies (Sumner et al., 2011). To complete the COWAT, participants 
named as many words as possible starting with the letters “A,” “F,” & “S,” each within a 
60 second interval. Participants were advised that names and responses with the same 
stem as a previous response would not be counted. COWAT scores were calculated by 
averaging the number of words generated within-subject across all three letter prompts. 
 CaR-FA-X model interactions. To examine the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms in 
conjunction with one another, three two-way interactions and one three-way interaction 
term were calculated using the within-subject mean single-item response scores for each 
of the three CaR-FA-X model variables. All three variables were first centered around 
their respective means by subtracting the single-item response sample mean from each 
individual’s single-item response mean to reduce the impact of multi-collinearity in the 
analysis. Interaction terms were then calculated by multiplying the respective CaR-FA-X 
model variables to produce the following terms: trait rumination x avoidant coping  
(CaR-FA interaction), trait rumination x verbal fluency (CaR-X interaction), avoidant 
coping x verbal fluency (FA-X interaction), and trait rumination x avoidant coping x 
verbal fluency (CaR-FA-X interaction). 
 Symptoms of related psychopathology. In order to examine the relationship 
between cognitive attributional style, OGM, CaR-FA-X model variables, and sub-clinical 
depressive and post-traumatic symptomatology, participants also completed 
computerized measures assessing recent experience of symptoms common to MDD and 
PTSD. Each measure is described below.  
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 MDD symptomatology. A computerized version of the Patient Health  
Questioinnaire-9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) was used to measure 
frequency of depressive symptoms within the past two weeks. The instrument consists of 
a single scale (α = .89) featuring nine questions regarding recent experience of different 
depressive symptoms, answered on a Likert scale of 0 “Not at all” to 3 “Nearly every 
day.” The instrument manual suggests using scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20 as cutoff scores 
for mild, moderate, moderately severe, and severe depression, however, for the purposes 
of this study, scores were only used in their raw format, and not as the basis for creating 
comparison groups. While sum scores were used to describe the sample in terms of 
depressive symptomatology, the PHQ-9 score used in the analysis was calculated by 
averaging within-subject single-item response scores for each participant. 
 PTSD symptomatology. PTSD symptomatology was assessed using a computerized 
version of the PTSD Checklist for DSM-V (PCL-5; Weathers, Litz, Keane, Palmieri, 
Marx, & Schnurr, 2013). Participants answered 20 questions regarding the extent to 
which they were affected by post-traumatic stress symptoms within the past month using 
a Likert scale format of 0 “Not at all” to 4 “Extremely.” As with the PHQ-9, scores were 
only used in their raw, format (α = .94). Sum scores on the PCL-5 were calculated to 
describe the sample in terms of post-traumatic stress symptomatology, however the 
scores used in the analysis were calculated by averaging within-subject single-item 
response scores for each participant. To calculate the participant scores in the analysis, all 
PCL-5 questions that were duplicated in the PHQ-9 were excluded from the PCL-5 score 
calculation in order to reduce multi-collinearity between measures of MDD and PTSD 
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symptomatology, as well as to isolate exclusively trauma-associated symptoms from 
mood-related symptoms common to both disorders. Administration of the PCL-5 in this 
study further differed from typical administration in that the standard instrument assesses 
trauma-related symptomatology in connection with one stressful event or set of events 
that is identified by the participant (i.e., Criterion A) prior to completing the Likert scale 
portion of the PCL-5. In the current study, participants did not identify a stressful event 
before reporting symptoms via Likert scale, and thus were not instructed to complete the 
Likert scale with any particular stressful incident in mind. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed all measures online via Qualtrics. Participants first completed 
the COWAT to prevent fatigue effects from influencing the measurement of typical 
executive control. Participants then completed the AMT prior to completing the 
rumination, FA, symptomatology, and attributional style measures in order to prevent 
fatigue effects from influencing the quality of memory responses given. Following 
administration of the AMT, participants completed the ASQ, followed by the RRS and 
the WAYS escape-avoidance scale. Participants then completed the MDD and PTSD 
symptomatology measures (PHQ-9 and PCL-5), followed by a short demographic 
questionnaire. Participants signed electronic consent forms prior to administration. 
 Before performing the analysis, the participant response data was filtered to exclude 
scores for participants who did not complete all seven measurements, as well as to 
exclude scores for participants who showed no response variance on one or more of the 
seven measures (e.g., answering “2” on the Likert scale for every question on the PCL-5). 
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Results 
AMT Inter-Rater Reliability 
 Reliability ranged from moderate to perfect, depending on the coding scheme. When 
the raters coded responses according to the five-category method, inter-rater reliability 
across all 10 word probes ranged from .42 to .58 (M = .50, SD = .06). This is a moderate 
level of agreement, and is above the minimum acceptable level for inter-rater agreement 
(Cohen, 1960). When responses were coded according to the two-category method, 
reliabilities ranged from .53 – 1.00 (M = .78, SD = .19), showing moderate to perfect 
agreement (Cohen, 1960). Reliabilities for each word probe are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
 
Inter-Rater Reliability by AMT Word Probe (N = 107) 
 
AMT Word Probe Memory Type Reliability Specificity Reliability 
             1. Happy .42 .63 
             2. Sorry    .54 .69 
             3. Safe .49 .62 
             4. Angry .50 1.00 
             5. Interested .57 1.00 
             6. Clumsy .42 .78 
             7. Successful .45 .53 
      8. Hurt (Emotionally) .47 1.00 
             9. Surprised .58 .58 
           10. Lonely .52 1.00 
 
Note. All reliabilities calculated as Cohen’s kappa. “Memory Type Reliability” refers 
to Williams and Broadbent’s (1986) scheme by which participant responses were 
coded according to the type of memory recalled (i.e., specific, categoric, extended, 
semantic association, or omission). “Specificity Reliability” refers to a simplified 
scheme by which responses were coded as either “specific” or “not specific.”  
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Descriptive Statistics 
 The mean numbers of within-participant occurrences of each memory response type 
are provided in Table 4, along with standard deviations. The data from the two raters 
were averaged into aggregate scores for each participant. These aggregate mean scores 
were used as the criterion variable in the hierarchical multiple correlation regression 
analysis.  
 According to the standard AMT coding scheme, participants gave more specific 
memory responses than any other type (M = 3.71, SD = 2.73). Categoric memories (M = 
2.28, SD = 1.76) and semantic associations (M = 1.57, SD = 1.96) were more common 
than extended memories (M = .82, SD = .87). There were few omissions (M = .19, SD = 
.42), and since an omission signifies a lack of response, omissions were excluded from 
the “nonspecific” category in the binary coding scheme. The general level of memory 
specificity in the sample, as signified by the number of specific memory responses on the 
AMT, was in line with recent validation data for the instrument although more response 
variation was observed in the current sample (specific memory M = 3.70, SD = .05; 
Heron, Crane, Gunnell, Lewis, Evans, & Williams, 2012). Average memory specificity in 
the current sample was lower, however, than the level of specificity observed during the 
first use of the minimal instructions AMT (specific memory M = 6.36, SD = .24; Debeer 
et al., 2009). 
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Table 4 
 
Within-Participant Occurrences of Observed AMT Memory Types by Rater (N = 107) 
 
Memory Type Rater 1 Rater 2 Aggregate 
5-Category M SD M SD M SD 
Specific 3.98 2.91 3.45 2.72 3.71 2.73 
Categorical 2.42 2.09 2.14 1.80 2.28 1.76 
Extended .86 1.10 .77 .87 .82 .87 
Semantic Association 1.08 1.73 2.05 2.34 1.57 1.96 
Omission .27 .59 .11 .36 .19 .42 
2-Category       
Specific 3.98 2.91 3.45 2.72 3.71 2.73 
Nonspecific 4.37 2.99 4.96 3.01 4.67 2.91 
Positive Word Probe       
Specific 1.96 1.52 1.70 1.49 1.83 1.44 
Nonspecific 2.23 1.60 2.23 1.60 2.23 1.60 
Negative Word Probe       
Specific 2.02 1.60 1.74 1.54 1.88 1.51 
Nonspecific 2.14 1.62 2.45 1.64 2.30 1.56 
 
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. Means and standard deviations listed in this 
table reflect the mean number of times each memory type occurs across a single 
participant. The aggregate data consists of an average of the data from rater 1 and rater 2 
across participants. The aggregate data were used in all hypothesis testing. 
 
 When comparing specific to nonspecific responses, participants gave significantly 
more nonspecific responses (M = 4.67, SD = 2.91) than specific ones (M = 3.71, SD = 
2.73; t = -2.43, p < .05). Participants also gave more nonspecific responses to both 
positive (M = 2.23, SD = 1.60) and negative (M = 2.30, SD = 1.56) word probes than 
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specific ones (positive: M = 1.83, SD = 1.44; negative: M = 1.88, SD = 1.51); however 
the differences were not statistically significant (positive: t = -1.83, p = .07; negative: t = 
-1.88, p = .06). 
 Scores on the three CaR-FA-X model variables are summarized in Table 5. Overall, 
participants reported engaging in ruminative behavior “sometimes” (single-item M = 
1.91, SD = 1.08; total M = 50.67, SD = 15.85), with the tendency remaining consistent 
across the brooding (single-item M = 2.02, SD = 1.16; total M = 12.20, SD = 3.84) and 
reflection (singe-item M = 2.06, SD = .75; total M = 10.32, SD = 3.75) subscales. The 
only normative data available for the RRS comes from a Japanese sample of female 
university students who were validating a translation of the instrument. The overall 
sample mean of this study was greater than the mean of the normative sample, although 
brooding and reflection scores were similar (normative sample RRS M = 41.92, SD = 
13.00; brooding M = 10.25, SD = 3.61; reflection M = 9.15, SD = 3.27; Hasegawa, 2013). 
 Participants reported a moderate degree of avoidant coping (single-item M = 2.39, SD 
= .58) on the WAYS escape-avoidance scale, suggesting that participants “somewhat” 
engage in avoidant coping. The overall sample mean score on the escape-avoidance scale 
(M = 19.21, SD = 5.45) was much higher than the normative data for the scale (M = 3.18, 
SD = 2.48; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). COWAT responses were counted and scored, 
with participants averaging 12.56 words per letter probe (SD = 4.50), with a mean total of 
37.72 words across all three letter probes (SD = 13.56). This is below the most recent 
normative COWAT score for adults under the age of 40 (M = 43.51, SD = 5.44), but 
above the normative score for adults without a college education (M = 30.07, SD = 13.09; 
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Loonstra, Tarlow, & Sellers, 2001). This suggests that the sample’s average COWAT 
score was within a normal range given the mean sample age and undergraduate status. 
Table 5 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics – CaR-FA-X Model Variables (N = 107)  
 
 
Scale M (Single-item) SD (Single-item) M (Total) SD (Total) 
RRS 1.91 1.08 50.67 15.85 
                                       
Brooding   
 
2.02 
 
1.16 
 
12.20 
 
3.84 
Reflection 2.06 .75 10.32 3.75 
WAYS Escape-
Avoidance 
2.39 .58 19.21 5.45 
COWAT 12.56 4.50 37.72 13.56 
 
Note. The brooding and reflection subscales together do not comprise the full RRS. M = 
Mean. SD = Standard deviation. Means and standard deviations listed in this table reflect 
the average score per item on each instrument listed. 
  
 Participant scores on the memory-encoding variable (i.e., cognitive attributional style) 
are summarized in Table 6. Average participant scores on the internality subscale 
indicated a tendency to see the cause of events as more internal (i.e., more due to 
themselves than other people or circumstances [single-item M = 6.55, SD = 1.29; total M 
= 79.74, SD = 14.22]). Overall, participants tended to see the causes of given events on 
the ASQ as being moderately stable (single-item M = 5.60, SD = 1.48; total M = 67.37, 
SD = 17.57), suggesting that the causes identified by participants may or may not be 
present in the future. Participants tended to lean toward a slightly more global view of 
their own identified event causes (single-item M = 5.88, SD = 1.57; total M = 71.23, 
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18.54), indicating that they believed that those causes were likely to influence other areas 
of their lives. Average participant scores on the ASQ in the current sample were much 
higher than those of the sample used to validate the instrument, suggesting that the 
overall sample demonstrated a more pessimistic attributional style than average 
(internality M = 23.50, SD = 3.30, stability M = 15.30, SD = 5.20, globality M = 19.20, 
SD = 4.30; Travers, Creed, & Morrissey, 2015). 
Table 6 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics – Attributional Style Questionnaire (N = 107) 
 
Scale 
M (Single-item) SD (Single-
item) 
M (Total) SD (Total) 
Internality 6.55 1.29 79.74 14.22 
Stability 5.60 1.48 67.37 17.57 
Globality 5.88 1.57 71.23 18.54 
 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. 
  
 
 Participant average scores on the MDD and PTSD symptomatology control variables 
are shown in Table 7 below. The PHQ-9 suggests scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20 as cutoffs 
representing mild, moderate, moderately severe, and severe depression respectively 
(Kroeneke at al., 2001). The sample overall showed a mild to moderate level of 
depressive symptomatology according to these cutoffs (M = 9.54, SD = 7.52). In fact, the 
sample mean was significantly higher than the suggested cutoff score for mild 
depression, t(106) = 6.19, p<.001. On the PCL-5, a score of 33 or above suggests possible 
PTSD. The sample mean was below this cutoff, with wide variation in scores (M = 25.92, 
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SD = 22.71). For the PCL-5, the sample mean was significantly lower than the suggested 
cutoff score, t(106) = -3.09, p<.01. 
Table 7 
 
Descriptive Statistics – MDD and PTSD Symptomatology (N = 107) 
 
Scale M (Single-item) SD (Single-item) M (Total) SD (Total) 
PHQ-9 1.06 .84 9.54 7.52 
PCL-5 1.30 1.14 25.92 22.71 
 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. Descriptive statistics in this table refer to the 
average overall score for each instrument. 
 
 Since OGM has been most prominently observed in individuals with MDD and 
PTSD, information on participants’ pre-existing mental health diagnoses and treatment 
was also collected (see Table 8 below). Seven participants (6.5% of the total sample of 
107) identified as having been diagnosed with MDD, one identified as having been 
diagnosed with PTSD, and an additional six reported being diagnosed with a mental 
health condition other than MDD or PTSD. Overall, 15.0% of the sample (six 
individuals) said they had received some kind of mental health treatment in the past. 
Three participants said they were currently taking medication for a mental health 
condition, and eight reported that they were currently experiencing symptoms of their 
mental health condition.  
 
 
  37 
 
Table 8 
 
Descriptive Statistics – Participant Mental Health Conditions and Treatment (N = 107) 
 
Mental Health 
Characteristics N Percentage 
MDD Diagnosis   
Yes 7 6.54% 
No 100 93.46% 
PTSD Diagnosisa   
Yes 1 .95% 
No 104 99.05% 
Other Diagnosis   
Yes 6 5.61% 
No 101 94.39% 
Previous Treatmenta   
Yes 16 14.95% 
No 90 84.91% 
Currently Taking 
Medicationa   
Yes 3 2.80% 
No 103 97.17% 
Currently Experiencing 
Symptoms   
Yes 8 7.48% 
No 99 92.52% 
 
Note. N = Number of participants in the whole sample. n = Number of participants that 
identified with the given statement. aFor items marked with this superscript, at least one 
participant response was missing. 
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 Comparing the self-report mental health data with the PHQ-9 and PCL-5 scores, there 
appear to be higher levels of mental health symptomatology in the sample than directly 
reported by participants, particularly depressive symptomatology. Examination of the 
quartile cut points for both measures revealed that, although few participants reported a 
formal mental health diagnosis, over half the sample scored above the suggested cutoff 
for mild depression, while about one third of the sample scored above the suggested 
cutoff for possible PTSD (see Table 9). This confirms, then, that the average PHQ-9 and 
PCL-5 scores in the sample were not due to a few extremely high scores. Rather, the 
sample more closely approximated a clinical sample than originally anticipated. 
Table 9. 
 
Quartile Cut Points – PHQ-9 and PCL-5 Sample Scores (N = 107) 
 
 Percentile 
Scale 25th 50th 75th 
PHQ-9 3.00 9.00 16.00 
PCL-5 6.75 17.00 42.00 
 
Note. N = Number of participants in the whole sample. Quartile cut-off scores are total 
scale scores. 
  
Hierarchical Linear Multiple Regression Analysis 
 A four-step hierarchical multiple regression correlation was conducted in order to 
explore the relationship between OGM, the CaR-FA-X model variables, and cognitive 
attributional style. The independent variables are divided into the following groups: 
mental health variables, individual CaR-FA-X model variables, CaR-FA-X model  
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two- and three-way interaction terms, and cognitive attributional style variables. Table 10 
provides a correlation matrix describing the zero-order relationships between all 12 
independent predictor variables and the criterion variable – OGM. Examination of the 
residuals from the multiple regression analysis confirmed that the data were normally 
distributed (skewness = -.24, kurtosis = -.81). 
 In examining the zero-order correlations, all predictor variables, with the exception of 
executive control and internality, appear highly correlated with one another. Of course, it 
is expected that rumination, functional avoidance, and executive control would be 
correlated with the four CaR-FA-X model interaction terms, despite attempting to reduce 
multi-collinearity through mean-centering the mechanism scores before creating the 
interaction terms. Surprisingly, however, only executive control and the three CaR-FA-X 
model interaction terms containing executive control (i.e., CaR-FA-X,  
CaR-X, and FA-X) were significantly correlated with OGM (executive control, r = .38, 
p<.001; CaR-FA-X interaction, r = .29, p<.001; CaR-X interaction, r = .36, p<.001;  
FA-X interaction, r = .30, p<.001).
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Table 10. 
 
Pearson Correlations of Criterion and Predictor Variables (N = 107) 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. MDD Symptomatology --            
2. PTSD Symptomatology .86*** --           
3. Rumination (CaR) .73*** .76*** --          
4. Functional Avoidance (FA) .34*** .43*** .42***   --         
5. Executive Control (X) .02 .00 .11** .17*   --        
6. CaR-FA-X Interaction .18* .22* .26** .27** .45***    --       
7. CaR-FA Interaction .24** .28** .23** .36*** .17* .46***   --      
8. CaR-X Interaction 
.70*** .68*** .92*** .43*** .34*** .44*** .32***   --     
9. FA-X Interaction 
.19* .23** .30*** .66*** .84*** .57*** .35 .50*** --    
10. Internality 
.20* .15 .06 -.16* .00 -.11 .02 .03 -.12 --   
11. Stability 
.41*** .38*** .42*** .05 .07 .08 .02 .41***  .10 .25** --  
12. Globality 
.34*** .34*** .38*** .18* .15 -.05 .01 .36***  .18* .29*** .45*** -- 
13. Autobiographical Memory 
Specificity -.05 -.09 .10 -.03 .38*** .27** -.06 .22**  .30*** .04 .03 
-
.02 
 
Note. * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, ***p≤.001. 
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 The overall relationship between the predictors and autobiographical memory specificity in 
step one was not significant [R2 = .01, R2Adj = -.01, F(2, 103) = .55, p = .58], as shown in Table 
11. Therefore, MDD symptomatology and PTSD symptomatology were not significantly related 
to OGM, although they were included in the analysis as control variables based on prior 
research.  
 At step two, however, the relationship between the predictors and the criterion was 
significant [R2 = .20, R2Adj = .16, F(5, 98) = 4.90, p<.001]. Thus, the individual CaR-FA-X model 
variables were significantly related to autobiographical memory specificity, as is consistent with 
prior research. The change in R2 between steps one and two was also significant (ΔR2 = .19, ΔF = 
7.74, p<.001) therefore, the individual CaR-FA-X model predictors had a significant incremental 
effect on OGM over and above that of the non-significant mental health predictors in step one. 
 The overall relationship between the added predictors in step three and autobiographical 
memory specificity was also significant [R2 = .26, R2Adj = .19, F(4, 94) = 3.66, p<.001]. Thus the 
four collective interaction term variables were significantly related to autobiographical memory 
specificity. The change in R2 between steps two and three, however, only approached 
significance (ΔR2 =.06, ΔF = 1.79, p = .12). The CaR-FA-X model interaction terms might have 
demonstrated a significant effect on OGM over and above that of the individual CaR-FA-X 
model mechanisms given a larger sample size. 
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Table 11. 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Results, Standardized Coefficients, and Pearson Correlations (N = 107) 
 
Variable R β t sr2 Tolerance R R2 R2Adj F ΔR2 ΔF 
Step 1 – Mental Health Variables -- -- -- -- -- .10 .01 -.01 .55 .01 .55 
1. MDD Symptomatology -.05 .11 .56 .05 .26 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2. PTSD Symptomatology -.09 -.18 -.93 -.09 .26 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Step 2 – Individual CaR-FA-X Model 
Variables 
-- -- -- -- -- .44 .20 .16 4.90*** .19 7.74*** 
3. Rumination   .10 .32 2.24* .20 .38 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
4. Functional Avoidance  -.03 -.10 -1.01 -.09 .77 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
5. Executive Control .38*** .36 3.91** .35 .94 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Step 3 – CaR-FA-X Model Interaction -- -- -- -- -- .51 .26 .19 3.66*** .06 1.79 
6. CaR-FA-X Interaction .27** .07 .45 .04 .34 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
7. CaR-FA Interaction -.06 -.17 -1.62 -.14 .69 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
8. CaR-X Interaction .22** .39 1.12 .10 .07 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
9. FA-X Interaction .30*** .77 .95 .08 .01 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Step 4 – Cognitive Attributional Style -- -- -- -- -- .53 .28 .19 2.98*** .02 .95 
10. Internality .04 .15 1.52 .13 .76 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
11. Stability .03 -.07 -.58 -.05 .63 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
12. Globality -.02 -.09 -.79 -.07 .66 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Note. ***p≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05. All values are for the step in which the variables were entered. 
  43 
 The overall relationship in step four was significant as well [R2 = .28, R2Adj = .19, F(3, 
91) = 2.98, p<.01]. Therefore, the cognitive attributional style dimensions are 
significantly related to autobiographical memory specificity. The change in R2 between 
steps three and four was not significant (ΔR2 =.02, ΔF = .95, p = .64), therefore the 
cognitive attributional style dimensions did not have a significant effect on OGM over 
and above that of the mental health and CaR-FA-X model variables. 
 Tolerance and beta statistics for each of the variables can be found in Table 11. 
Although executive control and the three associated CaR-FA-X model interaction terms 
were significantly correlated with autobiographical memory specificity, only executive 
control made a significant unique individual contribution (β = .36, p<.001), accounting 
for 35% of the observed variance in autobiographical memory specificity at step 2. 
Executive control was related to autobiographical memory specificity such that higher 
levels of executive control were related to higher levels of autobiographical memory 
specificity.  
 The three-way CaR-FA-X model interaction term was significantly correlated with 
MDD symptomatology (r = .18, p<.05), PTSD symptomatology (r = .22, p<.05), 
rumination (r = .26, p<.01), FA (r = .27, p<.01),  and executive control (r = .45, p<.001), 
likely reflecting the inter-correlations of each of the three individual variables that 
contributed to the interaction term. Indeed, both rumination and FA were significantly 
correlated with MDD symptomatology (rumination, r = .73, p<.001; FA, r = .34, p<.001) 
and PTSD symptomatology (rumination, r = .76, p<.001; FA, r = .43, p<.001). Thus, it is 
unsurprising that the CaR-FA-X model interaction term was also significantly correlated 
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with these variables. A similar case can be made for the correlational relationships 
between the CaR-X and FA-X interactions and the other predictor variables (see Table 
10).  
 In examining the unique contributions of each predictor to the analysis, only 
rumination (β = .32, t = 2.24, p<.05) and executive control (β = .36, t = 3.91, p<.001) 
made significant contributions. Although they were significantly correlated with 
autobiographical memory specificity, the interaction terms containing executive control 
did not significantly contribute to the analysis (CaR-FA-X: β = .07, t = .45, p = .66;  
CaR-X: β = .39, t = 1.12, p = .26; FA-X: β = .77, t = .95, p = .35). This, taken together 
with the insignificant change in R2 at step 3 suggests that the variance that would have 
been accounted for by the CaR-FA-X model interaction term was already accounted for 
by the other predictors in the study, thus the CaR-FA-X model interaction cannot 
uniquely account for the observed variance in OGM. 
 Rumination made a significant contribution to the analysis, accounting for 20% of the 
variance observed in step 2, despite not being significantly correlated with the criterion 
variable. This suggests that rumination is likely a suppressor variable, and thus does not 
directly explain variance in autobiographical memory specificity, but instead may explain 
variance in the criterion through another variable. Examining further, rumination was 
significantly correlated with the CaR-FA-X model interaction terms (CaR-FA-X, r = .27, 
p<.01; CaR-X, r = .22, p<.01; FA-X, r = .30, p<.001), which were significantly related to 
OGM, but did not make a significant contribution to the analysis. However, rumination 
made a significant contribution to the analysis before the CaR-FA-X interactions were 
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entered into the model. It seems, then, that rather than explaining variance in 
autobiographical memory specificity by explaining variance in any of the three  
CaR-FA-X model interaction terms containing executive control, rumination explains 
variance in autobiographical memory specificity by explaining variance in executive 
control itself. 
 Executive control was the only variable that both had a significant Pearson correlation 
with OGM and significantly contributed to the analysis, suggesting that executive control 
is related to autobiographical memory specificity and directly explains a portion of the 
variance, such that a higher level of executive control is associated with a higher level of 
autobiographical memory specificity. 
  46 
Discussion 
 The primary purpose of the study was to explore the well-known relationship between 
mental health symptomatology (i.e., MDD and PTSD), mechanisms impacting memory 
retrieval (i.e., the CaR-FA-X mechanisms), and autobiographical memory specificity in 
light of a possible additional relationship between autobiographical memory specificity 
and memory encoding (i.e., cognitive attributional style). To examine these relationships, 
mental health (MDD and PTSD symptomatology) and CaR-FA-X model predictors 
(rumination, functional avoidance, executive control, and the CaR-FA-X model 
interaction term) were compared with an encoding predictor (the three cognitive 
attributional style scales: internality, stability, and globality) in a four-step hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis. The following three questions guided this exploratory study:  
1) Do each of the individual CaR-FA-X model mechanisms contribute significant 
unique variance to a measure of OGM (the AMT)?  
2) Does the CaR-FA-X model as a whole contribute significant additional unique 
variance to AMT performance over and above the variance accounted for by the 
CaR-FA-X elements independently? 
3) Does cognitive attribution account for unique variability in AMT performance not 
captured by the CaR-FA-X model? 
MDD and PTSD Symptoms 
 Few, if any, previous studies have examined the contributions of all three  
CaR-FA-X model mechanisms to autobiographical memory specificity, in comparison to 
one another. This is interesting because the findings of the present study differ from the 
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majority of OGM research in a number of ways. First, while most studies show a 
relationship between the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms and autobiographical memory 
specificity independent of MDD or PTSD status, virtually all previous OGM research 
does provide evidence of a relationship between OGM and symptoms of these two 
disorders (Anderson et al., 2010; Ono et al., 2015; Sumner et al., 2010). Although the 
current study did not specifically seek to examine the connection between OGM and 
mental health variables, step one of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis was 
comprised of MDD and PTSD symptom measurements in order to control for the effect 
of these variables on autobiographical memory specificity. It is interesting to note, then, 
that the current study did not support this substantiated connection between OGM and 
MDD or PTSD symptomatology.  
 One possible reason for this surprising finding may be an incompatibility between the 
diagnostic composition of the study sample and the version of the AMT used to detect 
OGM in this study. As expected, very few participants reported a diagnosis of MDD or 
PTSD. However, the average participant score on the PHQ-9 (measure of MDD 
symptomatology) fell close to the suggested moderate depression cutoff score, while 
about one third of the sample scored above the suggested possible PTSD cutoff score on 
the PCL-5. This suggests that participants in the current study experienced a greater 
number of MDD and PTSD symptoms than the self-reported diagnostic statistics would 
otherwise have indicated. This raises the concern that there may have been a number of 
participants with undiagnosed, clinical levels of MDD and/or PTSD present in the 
sample.  
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 A possible explanation for the unforeseen levels of MDD and PTSD symptomatology 
observed in the current sample is that the reported symptoms may have been 
circumstantial. The study was administered during the three weeks leading up to, and 
encompassing, finals week. Since the sample was comprised entirely of undergraduate 
psychology students, many of the reported MDD and PTSD symptoms (e.g., trouble 
sleeping, difficulty concentrating, etc.) may have been due to the stress of finals rather 
than undiagnosed psychopathology. Further, since the sample was ethnically diverse, the 
political climate in the United States at the time of the study administration may also 
have played a role in increasing reported MDD and PTSD symptomatology (i.e., fear that 
immigrant students themselves and/or families of immigrant students may be forcibly 
removed from the country). Although both of these stressful conditions may have 
contributed to the observed levels of MDD and PTSD symptomatology in the study, it is 
still important to consider how these relatively high levels of observed mental health 
symptomatology may have impacted the results of the regression analysis. 
 It is possible that the lack of observed relationship between the mental health 
symptomatology variables and OGM may have been due to measurement error. The 
version of the AMT used in this study (the minimal instructions AMT) has been 
specifically shown to detect OGM in non-clinical samples (i.e., samples comprised 
largely of individuals with few symptoms of MDD and/or PTSD). The results of the 
present study, then, are unsurprising because this more sensitive version of the AMT 
likely detected the OGM phenomenon in participants both with and without subclinical 
symptoms of MDD or PTSD at similar levels. Further, the use of an over-sensitive 
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measure (i.e., the standard AMT) in non-clinical samples has been shown to produce a 
ceiling effect in which observed autobiographical memory specificity is so high that the 
relationship between OGM and depressive symptomatology disappears. The opposite 
appears to have happened in the current sample, with an under-sensitive measure 
designed for use in non-clinical samples (i.e., the minimal instructions AMT) producing a 
floor effect in a sample that more closely approximated a clinical one. This may have 
contributed to the lack of observed relationship between OGM and the mental health 
variables. 
Individual Contributions of CaR-FA-X Model Mechanisms 
 The results of the present study further differed from previous research on the  
CaR-FA-X model in that, of the individual CaR-FA-X model mechanisms, only 
executive control significantly explained unique variance in OGM. Previous studies of 
autobiographical memory specificity have found that rumination and executive control, 
especially, are robustly related to the OGM phenomenon. There is comparatively less 
support for the relationship between FA and OGM (Sumner, 2012). Thus, it is startling 
that the direct connections between the CaR and FA mechanisms and OGM were not 
supported in the current study.  
 Capture and Rumination (CaR).  The majority of OGM research suggests a strong, 
if not causal, relationship between rumination and autobiographical memory specificity 
(Spinhoven et al., 2007). In the present study, however, rumination appeared to indirectly 
contribute unique variance to autobiographical memory specificity through explaining 
variance in executive control rather than by directly explaining variance in OGM. One 
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possible reason for this result may lie in the discrepancy between the minimal 
instructions version of the AMT used in this study and high number of PHQ-9 and PCL-5 
scores indicating latent clinical levels of MDD and PTSD symptomatology.  
 The minimal instructions AMT was designed for use in non-clinical samples, since 
the standard AMT was insufficiently sensitive to detect OGM in these samples (Debeer et 
al., 2009). When using the standard AMT in non-clinical samples, researchers routinely 
observed a ceiling effect, with participants retrieving too many specific memories to 
detect the OGM phenomenon. When this ceiling effect occurred, OGM’s characteristic 
correlations to depressive symptoms and rumination – which are virtually always 
observed in clinical populations – could not be detected either (Raes, Hermans, Williams, 
& Eelen, 2007; Raes et al., 2006). When the minimal instructions AMT is used in  
non-clinical populations, both the OGM phenomenon and the typical correlations are 
clearly observed (e.g., Debeer et al., 2009).  
 Since the sample consisted entirely of undergraduate psychology students, it was 
expected that the sample would resemble typical non-clinical samples and thus the 
minimal instructions AMT was deemed most appropriate to measure autobiographical 
memory specificity in the given sample. Closer examination of the sample’s distribution 
of PHQ-9 and PCL-5 scores after data collection revealed that, in terms of mental health 
symptom severity, the sample more closely resembled a clinical sample than a  
non-clinical one. Few, if any, studies have examined the use of the minimal instructions 
AMT in a clinical population. However, it stands to reason that the minimal instructions 
AMT may have been too sensitive to the OGM phenomenon in the given sample. Thus, it 
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may have failed to distinguish clinical levels of OGM from non-clinical OGM. This may 
have created a floor effect, where most participants gave too few specific responses, 
leading to a lack of observed relationship between OGM and the MDD symptomatology 
and rumination variables.  
 Despite the lack of direct relationship between trait rumination and autobiographical 
memory specificity, an indirect relationship was observed in the hierarchical analysis. 
Rumination explained significant variance in autobiographical memory specificity. 
Additionally, rumination was significantly related to MDD and PTSD symptomatology. 
None of these variables were significantly related to autobiographical memory 
specificity, likely for the reasons described above. However, an alternative interpretation 
for the lack of direct connection between OGM and rumination is that there may be a 
possible meditational relationship. Trait rumination may mediate the relationship between 
one or both of the mental health variables and OGM. Sutherland and Bryant’s (2007) 
finding that rumination mediates the relationship between depression and OGM supports 
this interpretation. 
 Another possible interpretation is that rumination contributed significant variance to 
autobiographical memory specificity by acting as a suppressor variable. As previously 
mentioned, rumination was significantly related to executive control. It was the only 
variable that was related to autobiographical memory specificity while also making a 
significant contribution to the analysis. Rumination was also related to the three  
CaR-FA-X interaction terms containing executive control, which were significantly 
related to autobiographical memory specificity without making a unique contribution to 
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the model. It is tempting to reason that rumination contributed unique variance to 
autobiographical memory specificity through influencing one of these interaction terms. 
However, since rumination was entered into the model prior to these variables and 
appeared to make a significant contribution at step 2, this is likely not the case. 
Rumination may, instead, have contributed to the analysis by accounting for variance in 
executive control. 
 As mentioned previously, few studies have examined the CaR-FA-X model 
components in connection with one another. No known studies have described an 
explanatory relationship between rumination and executive control in connection with 
OGM. Previous research examining both rumination and executive control in the context 
of OGM suggests that working memory, a component of executive control, does not 
account for the relationship between rumination and OGM (Raes et al., 2006). Little, if 
any, research exists examining the connection between verbal fluency (the broad 
operationalization of executive control used in this study) and rumination in OGM.  
 However, outside of OGM research, various relationships between the brooding 
component of rumination and different aspects of executive control have been 
documented. Difficulties with both set-shifting and cognitive inhibition have been linked 
to brooding (Lo & Liu, 2017; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). This provides evidence that 
problems with changing mental set and blocking out irrelevant information – both 
functions of executive control – are related to rumination. Relationships between 
executive control and rumination, particularly brooding, have also been found in 
connection with induced stress. Deficits in executive control while coping with stress are 
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related to depression severity in high ruminators (Quinn & Joorman, 2014), while high 
ruminators also experience a decrease in salivary cortisol response during stress induction 
following training to increase executive control (Quinn, Keil, Utke, & Joorman, 2014). 
Thus, rumination level seems to influence an individual’s ability to use their cognitive 
resources – executive control – during times of stress.  
 Clearly, there is a relationship between rumination and executive control outside of 
OGM research. This relationship may extend to the OGM phenomenon although few 
studies have examined such a relationship. It stands to reason, then, that rumination may 
have indirectly accounted for variance in OGM in the current study by directly 
accounting for variance in executive control.  
 Functional Avoidance (FA). The observed correlation between rumination and 
avoidant coping contradicts CaR-FA-X model theory and previous research, which posits 
that rumination is more tied to OGM experienced in the context of depression, while the 
FA mechanism gives rise to OGM following trauma-induced stress (Sumner, 2012). 
CaR-FA-X model theory does not suggest that rumination and FA would be related in 
any way, since they are connected to psychopathologies that have historically been 
considered distinct. However, in the current study, avoidant coping and rumination 
shared several characteristics in common. First, neither FA nor rumination exhibited a 
relationship with OGM, although such a relationship was expected. Second, both 
variables were correlated with MDD and PTSD symptomatology while OGM was not. 
Third, both variables were significantly correlated with each other.  
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 The similarity in the relationships between rumination, FA, and the other variables 
coupled with rumination’s unclassified contribution to the analysis suggests that 
rumination may mediate the relationship between FA and OGM. While no such 
connection has yet been established, CaR-FA-X model theory may support this 
interpretation. Previous evidence suggests that the FA mechanism acts as a “gate” against 
involuntary bottom-up retrieval of specific negative memories in PTSD caused by 
impaired executive control (Ono et al., 2015). FA acts as a gate by outputting negative 
general memories instead of negative specific memories (Williams, 2006). If this gating 
action were due to mnemonic interlock caused by rumination, this would explain the 
observed relationship between rumination and FA, and their similar relationships with the 
mental health variables and OGM.  
 Indeed, research examining rumination and cognitive avoidance supports this 
interpretation. Rumination has been shown to mediate the effect of cognitive avoidant 
coping on sadness and anxiety (Dickson, Ciesla, & Reilly, 2012) and is also related to the 
use of cognitive avoidance strategies following induced stress (McEvoy, Moulds, & 
Mahoney, 2013). Some models of PTSD actually describe rumination as a cognitive 
avoidance strategy that prevents productive processing of the traumatic event by instead 
causing repetitive focus on irrelevant negative information (Echeverri, Jaeger, Chen, 
Moore, & Zoellner, 2011). Taken together, this supports the interpretation that the lack of 
relationship between avoidant coping and autobiographical memory specificity may be 
due to rumination’s lack of direct relationship with the criterion. 
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 Impaired Executive Control (X). Of the three CaR-FA-X model mechanisms, only 
executive control exhibited the expected relationship with OGM, in that it was both 
correlated with autobiographical memory specificity, and uniquely explained variance in 
OGM. Further, the lack of correlation with MDD and PTSD symptomatology suggests 
that the impaired executive control mechanism operates independently of the two 
disorders, and is instead a direct mechanism contributing to the phenomenon of reduced 
autobiographical memory specificity observed in these disorders. This is consistent with 
previous research on the relationship between executive control and OGM (Ellis & 
Ashbrook, 1988; Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Neshat-Doost et al., 2008; Ridout et al., 2016; 
Sumner et al., 2011). 
 Although alternate interpretations of the CaR and FA mechanism’s lack of 
relationship to OGM are offered above, it is also possible that impaired executive control 
is the only CaR-FA-X model mechanism directly at play in OGM. Indeed, if rumination 
does contribute to OGM by accounting for changes in executive control and mediating 
the relationship between functional avoidance and OGM, it would follow that impaired 
executive control would be the only one of the three mechanisms to directly impact 
OGM. This interpretation contradicts previous research linking rumination and FA to 
OGM, although much of this research has not examined the interrelationships between 
the CaR-FA-X model variables, and thus may not fully account for the nature of these 
mechanisms’ connection to OGM (Sumner, 2012).  Another possible explanation is that 
the 30-second time limit imposed upon participants’ typed responses to each AMT probe 
word may have resulted in a high degree of pressure to respond quickly, particularly for 
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those with a lower baseline level of executive control. Thirty-second response time limits 
are commonly used in orally administered AMT formats (e.g., Sumner et al., 2011); 
typed-response, computerized versions of the AMT have also been shown to replicate the 
OGM phenomenon (e.g., Rekart et al., 2006). However, the combination of these two 
features (i.e., 30-second response time limit x typed-response format) may have resulted 
in increased response pressure in individuals with lower executive control, thus leading to 
a decrease in demonstrated autobiographical memory specificity in those individuals. 
Since executive control plays a role in response time, the time pressure may have 
produced AMT responses that only varied based on executive control. Put another way, 
this time pressure may have prevented the relationship between OGM and the other two 
mechanisms (i.e., CaR and FA) from being detected. This explanation is partially 
supported by the finding that participants in a non-clinical sample demonstrate OGM 
following executive control depletion via the Stroop colour word task (Neshat-Doost et 
al., 2008). The time pressure, however, represents an acute stressor and may mimic a 
frustration induction. If it were the case that stress related to the time pressure played a 
key role in determining the observed relationships to OGM, it is expected that a 
relationship between OGM and FA would also have emerged, as this relationship has 
been demonstrated in non-clinical samples following an acute stress induction (Debeer, et 
al., 2012). 
 It is also possible that, given the diversity of the sample, there may have been an 
unusually high number of “English as a second language” (ESL) students represented. 
This would also explain the singular explanatory relationship between executive control 
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and autobiographical memory specificity, including the lack of relationship between 
autobiographical memory specificity and the other two CaR-FA-X model mechanisms 
(rumination and functional avoidance). Since both the AMT and COWAT (measures of 
autobiographical memory specificity and executive control) were timed, and thus 
required a high level of English fluency to generate rapid responses, it is possible that 
English language learners may have had a difficult time on both tasks. This difficulty 
may have exacerbated the relationship between autobiographical memory specificity and 
executive control, possibly overshadowing or confounding the other two mechanisms’ 
relationships to OGM. However, it is not possible to determine whether English fluency 
impacted the study results, as data regarding participants’ native language and English 
fluency was not collected.  
 Further, the majority of OGM research has been conducted in Western countries (i.e., 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, etc.). Although a few studies have 
replicated the OGM phenomenon in non-western countries (e.g., in Iranian suicide 
attempters [Kaviani, Rahimi-Darabad, & Naghavi, 2005], in Chinese middle school 
children with PTSD [Chen, Huang, Dang, & Zheng, 2012], in bereaved Afghan 
adolescents [Neshat-Doost, Yule, Kalantari, Rezvani, Dyregrov, & Jobson, 2014]), the 
construct has not been extensively substantiated as a cross-cultural phenomenon. 
Specifically, little research has been done in collectivistic Asian cultures, such as China 
and Japan. Although OGM has been detected in one Chinese sample, it is possible that 
OGM may be a phenomenon that is primarily observed in Western countries, where the 
emphasis is more on individual experience. It is possible that personal experience and 
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specificity in individual autobiographical memory may be less emphasized, and thus 
personal experience may be less likely to be reported specifically in Asian cultures. If 
OGM is a primarily Western phenomenon, then the sample’s diversity may partially 
explain the lack of observed relationship between the rumination and FA mechanisms 
and OGM. 
CaR-FA-X Model Interactions 
 As previously discussed, the two- and three-way CaR-FA-X model interaction terms 
did not have a significant incremental effect on autobiographical memory specificity 
above and beyond the individual CaR-FA-X model mechanisms, despite significant 
correlations with OGM among the interaction terms containing executive control. Since 
the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms have rarely been studied in conjunction with one 
another, this provides interesting insight into the relationships between the mechanisms. 
 The incremental effect of the CaR-FA-X model interaction terms over and above that 
of the individual CaR-FA-X model mechanisms approached significance at the trend 
level, thus suggesting that an effect might have been observed with a larger sample size, 
or under different circumstances (i.e., when direct relationships between rumination, FA, 
and OGM are observed). However, it is also possible that all three mechanisms do not 
combine to produce an effect on OGM greater than the sum of all three mechanisms. At 
face value, the current study provides evidence that the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms 
operate independently of one another. The CaR-FA-X model mechanisms do not appear 
to multiply the effects of one another.  
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Cognitive Attributional Style  
 The cognitive attributional style variables also did not have a significant incremental 
effect on autobiographical memory specificity over and above that of the individual  
CaR-FA-X model mechanisms and the interaction terms. All three cognitive attributional 
style dimensions were significantly related to MDD symptomatology, reflecting the  
well-documented connection between attributional style and MDD observed in the 
literature (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978; Moore et al., 2017; Ruegers & George, 2017). 
Stability and globality were also related to PTSD symptomatology and rumination. 
Internality and globality were also correlated with FA. These connections are 
unsurprising, given that many of the variables that were related to cognitive attributional 
style are interrelated themselves. 
 The cognitive attributional style dimensions did not have a significant incremental 
effect on OGM over and above that of the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms, although taken 
together the dimensions did uniquely account for 2% of the variance observed in OGM. 
This speaks to some kind of relationship between memory encoding and OGM, even 
though that relationship was not statistically significant and was likely largely accounted 
for by the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms. The lack of significant incremental effect on 
OGM above and beyond the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms suggests then that cognitive 
attributional style may not be an adequate representation of memory encoding for the 
purposes of OGM research. Indeed, the cognitive attributional style dimensions may be 
more indicative of how the meaning ascribed to life events impacts our self-perceptions 
rather than how we encode and assign meaning to specific event memories. Further 
  60 
research into the potential connection between OGM and other forms of memory 
encoding is necessary to determine whether memory encoding does, in fact, play a role in 
the OGM phenomenon. 
Strengths and Limitations of the Current Study 
 The current study had a number of strengths, most notably that it examined the  
CaR-FA-X model mechanisms both individually and in conjunction with one another, 
which is rare among OGM studies. Further, the current study compared the CaR-FA-X 
model with a possible alternate explanation for the OGM phenomenon, which only 
served to strengthen support for the CaR-FA-X model. One limitation of the study, 
however, was that the sample used in the study consisted of undergraduate psychology 
students, and thus the results of this study may not extend to a clinical population, despite 
the relatively high average levels of MDD and PTSD symptomatology observed in the 
sample. Size of the sample may also have prevented the incremental effects of the  
CaR-FA-X model from being detected. The minimal instructions AMT may also have 
been too sensitive for the sample, and thus potentially detected OGM in individuals who 
would not have demonstrated the phenomenon if they had been administered the 
traditional AMT instead. This may have prevented relationships between the mental 
health variables and autobiographical memory specificity from being detected. Finally, 
since the study only examined one operationalization of encoding in conjunction with 
OGM, no conclusions regarding the potential impact of encoding on OGM could be 
drawn beyond determining cognitive attributional style’s effectiveness as an encoding 
predictor. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 The current study found no correlation between OGM and several predictor variables 
that have previously evidenced strong relationships with the criterion (i.e., MDD 
symptomatology, PTSD symptomatology, rumination, and functional avoidance). Of the 
mental health and independent CaR-FA-X model variables, only rumination and 
executive control explained significant variance in autobiographical memory specificity. 
Of the two, only executive control contributed significant unique variance to the 
hierarchical linear regression model of OGM. The lack of relationship with the mental 
health symptomatology variables and rumination may be due to the use of an 
oversensitive measurement (the minimal instructions AMT) in an undergraduate sample 
with unexpected clinical characteristics. The lack of relationship with FA may be due to 
another CaR-FA-X model variable (possibly rumination) mediating the relationship 
between FA and OGM. Rumination may have contributed variance to OGM indirectly by 
explaining variation in executive control. It is possible, then, that differences in executive 
control observed in OGM research may be explained by rumination. Unexpected results 
may also be due to circumstantial stressors, measurement error, AMT administration 
format, or cultural factors. 
 Although three of the CaR-FA-X model interaction terms were significantly 
correlated with autobiographical memory specificity (i.e., CaR-FA-X, CaR-X, and  
FA-X), none of them contributed significant unique variance to OGM. Further, the  
CaR-FA-X model interaction terms did not have an incremental effect on OGM over and 
above that of the independent CaR-FA-X model variables. This suggests that the  
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CaR-FA-X model mechanisms operate independently of one another, or at the very least, 
that their effects do not compound to influence OGM. None of the cognitive attributional 
style variables (i.e., internality, stability, and globality) were significantly related to 
OGM, nor did they contribute significantly to the analysis. This suggests, at least, that 
cognitive attributional style is not an adequate operationalization of encoding for OGM 
research purposes.  
 The results of the current study suggest that future OGM research should focus on 
methodological issues such as evaluating the effectiveness of the minimal instructions 
AMT in clinical samples, as well as exploring various combinations of timed and typed 
AMT response formats. Future research should also examine on the effect of 
circumstantial stressors and English language learning status on AMT performance. 
Future CaR-FA-X model research should examine the nature of the relationship between 
rumination and the remaining two CaR-FA-X model mechanisms, as well as on further 
testing the CaR-FA-X model in non-Western cultures. Additional OGM research may 
also explore other potential memory encoding variables that might contribute to the OGM 
phenomenon.  
 Studies regarding the effectiveness of the minimal instructions AMT should examine 
the degree to which the instrument is successful in detecting differences in OGM in a 
clinical sample. The current study suggests that the minimal instructions version of the 
AMT may be too sensitive for use in clinical populations already prone to demonstrating 
high levels of OGM. Future research should determine whether the relationships between 
OGM and depressive symptoms and OGM and rumination disappear when the minimal 
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instructions AMT is used in a clinical sample versus a non-clinical sample. If so, this 
would reflect the pattern observed with the standard AMT when it is used in non-clinical 
samples. If it is substantiated that a floor effect typically results from using the minimal 
instructions version of the AMT in a clinical sample, this would help in establishing 
parameters for the optimum effectiveness of the minimal instructions AMT.  
 In examining methodological concerns in the AMT, it would be beneficial to further 
explore the effect of typed-response administrations on AMT performance. If the 
expected relationships between OGM and all three CaR-FA-X model mechanisms can be 
observed with a typed-response AMT, this would increase ease of administration and 
facilitate faster completion of OGM research on a larger scale. Comparison between 
typed-response and oral-response formats in terms of detected autobiographical memory 
specificity levels and ability to detect relationships between OGM and associated 
variables (i.e., depressive symptoms, PTSD symptoms, rumination, FA, and executive 
control) is necessary to determine the relative effectiveness of typed-response AMT 
formats. Although typed-response AMT administrations have replicated the relationship 
between depressive symptoms and OGM (e.g., Rekart et al., 2006), no known 
experimental comparison between typed and oral response formats exists. If successful, 
examination of the effect of timed versus untimed administration in a  
typed-response format AMT would help to establish guidelines for the possible use of a 
typed-response AMT in future OGM research, as no current protocol exists for 
administration of a typed-response AMT. 
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 Additional methodological research should examine the effectiveness of the AMT at 
detecting OGM in English language learners. Since the AMT is typically administered in 
a timed format, with a time limit ranging from 30 to 60 seconds per response, it may be 
difficult for English language learners to formulate full, specific responses to each probe 
in the time allotted. Thus, using the AMT in an ESL sample may result in increased 
observed OGM. Comparison of autobiographical memory specificity levels observed in 
an English-fluent sample should be compared with those observed in an ESL sample to 
determine the limitations of standard AMT use with English language learners. It would 
also be interesting to compare standard timed AMT administration scores for  
English-fluent participants with untimed English AMT administration scores for ESL 
participants. If OGM levels in both samples are similar, an untimed AMT administration 
maybe an appropriate accommodation for ESL participants. Regardless, future studies 
using the AMT would benefit from including a simple ESL screening question (e.g., “Is 
English your first language?”) with administration, in order to detect English language 
learning as a possible confounding variable. 
 Further research regarding OGM would benefit from examining the effect of 
circumstantial life stressors on AMT performance. Do individuals under relatively high 
degrees of life stress demonstrate more OGM than individuals under lower degrees of 
stress? The effect of experimental stress and frustration induction on AMT performance 
has been examined in previous OGM research (e.g., Debeer et al., 2012), however, little 
research has examined non-traumatic current life stressors in connection with OGM. If 
life stress level does impact AMT performance, controlling for life stress in future OGM 
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research may help to further isolate the effect of CaR-FA-X model mechanisms on OGM. 
Screening for current life stress, such as academic or political stressors, may help 
improve the quality of AMT data collected in future studies. For undergraduate samples 
in particular, it would be interesting to compare AMT performance at three distinct points 
in time: at the beginning of the semester, in the middle of the semester, and during finals. 
Such an investigation, combined with a measurement of experienced stress, would help 
illuminate the role of natural (i.e., non-experimental) stress in impacting OGM. 
 Future research on the connection between rumination and the other two  
CaR-FA-X model mechanisms should examine the nature of interrelationships among the 
three mechanisms, specifically focusing on a possible meditational relationship between 
rumination and FA, as well as a possible moderational relationship between rumination 
and executive control in connection with OGM. Research into whether  
rumination-induced mnemonic interlock plays a role in creating the FA gating 
mechanism would especially illuminate the nature of the relationship between these two 
mechanisms, while research into how specific components of executive control interact 
with rumination and its subcomponents would elucidate the connection between 
rumination and executive control. Continued examination of interactions among all three 
CaR-FA-X model mechanisms is also necessary. 
 Further research on OGM and the CaR-FA-X model should focus on replicating the 
OGM phenomenon in non-Western cultures, as well as on the effectiveness of the  
CaR-FA-X model in explaining any OGM observed in non-Western cultures. Although 
OGM has been demonstrated in suicidal, bereaved, and traumatized non-Western 
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samples, the phenomenon has not been replicated to the same degree in Eastern cultures 
as it has been in Western cultures. Further, few, if any, studies examining OGM in 
Eastern cultures have focused on testing the CaR-FA-X model. If OGM is repeatedly 
observed in non-Western samples, exploration of the CaR-FA-X model in these same 
non-Western samples is paramount to establishing the CaR-FA-X model as a pan-cultural 
account of the mechanisms underlying OGM. 
 Future research on the role of memory encoding in OGM should focus on finding 
other representations of memory encoding that may be related to autobiographical 
memory specificity, as well as the CaR-FA-X model mechanisms. Additional research on 
the relationship between the cognitive attributional style dimensions and the CaR-FA-X 
model mechanisms would help further determine whether an individual’s interpretation 
of events influences the mechanisms by which OGM occurs, and thus help explain the 
correlational relationship with the rumination and functional mechanisms observed in the 
current study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  67 
References 
Abramson, L.Y., Alloy, L.B., & Metalsky, G.I. (1990). The hopelessness theory of 
depression: Current status and future directions. In N.L. Stein, B. Levinthal, & T. 
Trabasso (Eds.), Psychological and biological approaches to emotion (pp. 333 – 
358). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Abramson, L.Y., Seligman, M.E., & Teasdale, J.D. (1978). Learned helplessness in 
humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49 – 
74. 
 
Anderson, R.J., Goddard, L., & Powell, J.H. (2010). Reduced specificity of 
autobiographical memory as a moderator of the relationship between daily hassles 
and depression. Cognition and Emotion, 24, 702 – 709. 
 
Belcher, J. & Kangas, M. (2014). Reduced goal specificity is associated with reduced 
memory specificity in depressed adults. Cognition and Emotion, 28, 163 – 171. 
 
Boelen, P.A, Huntjens, R.J.C, & van den Hout, M.A. (2014). Concurrent and prospective 
associations of habitual overgeneral memory and prospection with symptoms of 
depression, general anxiety, obsessive compulsiveness, and post-traumatic stress. 
Memory, 22, 747 – 758. 
 
Brittlebank, A.D., Scott, J., Williams, J.M.G, & Ferrier, I.N. (1993). Autobiographical 
memory in depression: Trait or state marker? British Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 
118 – 121. 
 
Bryant, R.A., Sutherland, K., & Guthrie, R.M. (2007). Impaired specific autobiographical 
memory as a risk factor for Posttraumatic stress after trauma. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 116, 837  - 841. 
 
Burwell, R.A. & Shirk, S.R. (2007). Subtypes of rumination in adolescence: Associations 
between brooding, reflection, depressive symptoms, and coping. Journal of 
Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 36, 56 – 65. 
 
Chen, X., Huang, Y., Dang, X., & Zheng, X. (2012). Reduced specificity of 
autobiographical memory in traumatized adolescents: Exploring the contributions 
of impaired executive control and affect regulation. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 44, 
112 – 120. 
 
Cohen, J. (1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 20, 37 – 46. 
 
  68 
Conway, M.A. & Pleydell-Pearce, C.W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107, 261 – 288. 
 
Crane, C., Barnhofer, T., & Williams, J.M.G. (2007). Cue self-relevance affects 
autobiographical memory specificity in individuals with a history of major 
depression. Memory, 15, 312 – 323. 
 
Dalgleish, T., Hill, E., Golden, A.J., Morant, N., & Dunn, B.D. (2011). The structure of 
past and future lives in depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 120, 1 – 15. 
 
Debeer, E., Hermans, D. & Raes, F. (2009). Associations between components of 
rumination and autobiographical memory specificity as measured by a Minimal 
Instructions Autobiographical Memory Test. Memory, 17, 892 – 903. 
 
Debeer, E., Raes. F., Claes, S., Vrieze, E., Williams, J.M.G., & Hermans, D. (2012). 
Relationship between cognitive avoidant coping and changes in overgeneral 
autobiographical memory retrieval following an acute stressor. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 43, S37 – S42. 
 
Dickson, K.S., Ciesla, J.A., & Reilly, L.C. (2012). Rumination, worry, cognitive 
avoidance, and behavioral avoidance: Examination of temporal effects. Behavior 
Therapy, 43, 629 – 640. 
 
Drummond, L.E., Dritschel, B., Astell, A., O’Carroll, R.E., & Dalgleish, T. (2006). 
Effects of age, dysphoria, and emotion-focusing on autobiographical memory 
specificity in children. Cognition and Emotion, 20, 488 – 505. 
 
Dykema, J., Bergbower, K., Doctora, J., & Peterson, C. (1996). An attributional style 
questionnaire for general use. Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 14, 100 
– 108. 
 
Echiverri, A.M., Jaeger, J.J., Chen, J.A., Moore, S.A., & Zoellner, L.A. (2011). 
‘Dwelling in the past’: The role of rumination in the treatment of posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 18, 338 – 349. 
 
Ellis, H.C. & Ashbrook, P.W. (1988). Resource allocation model of the effects of 
depressed mood states on memory. In K. Fiedler & J. Forgas (Eds.) Affect, 
cognition, and social behavior (pp. 25 – 43). Toronto: Hogrefe. 
 
Falco, D.E., Peynircioğlu, Z.F., & Hohman, T.J. (2015). Tendency to recall remote 
memories as a mediator of overgeneral recall in depression. Clinical 
Psychological Science, 3, 913 – 925. 
 
  69 
Folkman, S. & Lazarus, R.S. (1988). Manual for the Ways of Coping Scale. Palo Alto: 
Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. 
 
Griffith, J.W., Sumner, J.A., Raes, F., Barnhofer, T., Debeer, E., & Hermans, D. (2012). 
Current psychometric and methodological issues in the measurement of 
overgeneral memory. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
43, S21 – S31. 
 
Hasegawa, A. (2013). Translation and initial validation of the Japanese version of the 
ruminative responses scale. Psychological Reports: Mental and Physical Health, 
112, 716 – 726. 
 
Heeren, A., Van Broeck, N., & Philippot, P. (2009). The effects of mindfulness on 
executive processes and autobiographical memory specificity. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 47, 403 – 409. 
 
Heron, J., Crane, C., Gunnell, D., Lewis, G., Evans, J., & Williams, J.M.G. (2012). 
40,000 memories in young teenagers: Psychometric properties of the 
autobiographical memory test in a UK cohort study. Memory, 20, 300 – 320. 
 
Hertel, P.T. & Hardin, T.S. (1990). Remembering with and without awareness in a 
depressed mood: Evidence of deficits in initiative. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 119, 45 – 59. 
 
Honzel, N., Justus, T., & Swick, D. (2014). Posttraumatic stress disorder is associated 
with limited executive resources in a working memory task. Cognitive Affective & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 14, 792 – 804. 
 
Hitchcock, C., Nixon, R.D.V., & Weber, N. (2014). A longitudinal examination of 
overgeneral memory and psychopathology in children following recent trauma 
exposure. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 531 – 538. 
 
Johnson, J., Panagioti, M., Bass, J., Ramsey, L., & Harrison, R. (2017). Resilience to 
emotional distress in response to failure, error, or mistakes: A systematic review. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 52, 19 – 42. 
 
Joorman, J., Dkane, M., & Gotlib, I.H. (2006). Adaptive and maladaptive components of 
rumination? Diagnostic specificity and relation to depressive biases. Behavior 
Therapy, 37, 269 – 280. 
 
Kashdan, T.B., Roberts, J.E., & Carlos, E.L. (2006). Impact of depressive symptoms, 
self-esteem and neuroticism on trajectories of overgeneral autobiographical 
memory over repeated trials. Cognition and Emotion, 20, 383 – 401. 
 
  70 
Kaviani, H., Rahimi, M., Rahimi-Darabad, P., & Naghavi, H.R. (2011). Overgeneral 
memory retrieval and ineffective problem-solving in depressed patients with 
suicidal ideation: Implications for therapy. International Journal of Psychology 
and Psychological Therapy, 11, 413 – 423. 
 
Kaviani, H., Rahimi-Darabad, P., & Naghavi, H.R. (2005). Autobiographical memory 
retrieval and problem-solving deficits of Iranian depressed patients attempting 
suicide. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 27, 39 – 44. 
 
Kroenke, K., Spitzer, R.L., & Williams, J.B. (2001). The PHQ-9: Validity of a brief 
depression severity measure. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 16, 606 – 
613. 
 
Lo, B.C.Y., & Liu, J.C.C. (2017). Executive control in depressive rumination: Backward 
inhibition and non-inhibitory switching performance in a modified mixed 
antisaccade task. Frontiers in Psychology, 8.  
 
Loonstra, A.S., Tarlow, A.R., & Sellers, A.H. (2001). COWAT metanorms across age, 
education, and gender. Applied Neuropsychology, 8(3), 161 – 166. 
 
Maestas, K.L. & Rude, S.S. (2012). The benefits of expressive writing on 
autobiographical memory specificity: A randomized controlled trial. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 36, 234 – 246. 
 
McEvoy, P.M., Moulds, M.L., & Mahoney, A.E.J. (2013). Mechanisms driving pre- and 
post-stressor repetitive negative thinking: Metacognitions, cognitive avoidance, 
and thought control. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
44, 84 – 93. 
 
Michl, L.C., McLaughlin, K.A., Shepherd, K., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2013). 
Rumination as a mechanism linking stressful life events to symptoms of 
depression and anxiety: Longitudinal evidence in early adolescents and adults. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 122, 339 – 352. 
 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N.P., Emerson, M.J., Witzki, A.H., & Howerter, A. (2000). The 
unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 
‘frontal lobe’ tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49 – 
100. 
 
Moore, M.T., Fresco, D.M., Schumm, J.A., & Dobson, K.S. (2017). Change in 
explanatory flexibility and explanatory style in cognitive therapy and its 
components. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 41, 519 – 529. 
 
  71 
Neshat-Doost, H.T., Dalgleish, T., & Golden, A.J. (2008). Reduced specificity of 
emotional autobiographical memories following self-regulation depletion. 
Emotion, 8, 731 – 736. 
 
Neshat-Doost, H.T., Yule, W., Kalantari, M., Rezvani, S. R., Dyregrov, A., & Jobson, L. 
(2014). Reduced autobiographical memory specificity in bereaved Afghan 
adolescents. Memory, 22(6), 700 – 709. 
 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and 
posttraumatic stress symptoms after a natural disaster: The 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 115 – 121. 
 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B.E., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking rumination. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 400 – 424. 
 
Ono, M., Devilly, G.J., & Shum, D.H.K. (2015). A meta-analytic review of overgeneral 
memory: The role of trauma history, mood, and the presence of posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 8, 
157 – 164. 
 
Ono, M. & Devilly, G.J. (2013). The role of childhood and adult appraisal of self-
discrepancy in overgeneral memory retrieval. Cognition and Emotion, 27, 979 – 
994. 
 
Patterson, J. (2011). Verbal fluency. In Kreutzer, J.S., DeLuca, J., & Caplan, B. (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Clinical Neuropsychology (p. 2603 – 2606). New York: 
Springer. 
 
Quinn, M.E., Keil, D.C., Utke, S., & Joormann, J. (2014). Trait rumination moderates the 
effect of executive control training. Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, 5, 
289 – 301. 
 
Quinn, M.E. & Joormann, J. (2014). Cognitive processes and emotion regulation in 
depression. Depression and Anxiety, 31, 308 – 315. 
 
Raes, F., Hermans, D., de Decker, A., Eelen, P., & Williams, J.M.G. (2003). 
Autobiographical memory specificity and affect regulation: An experimental 
approach. Emotion, 3, 201 – 206.  
 
Raes, F., Hermans, D., Williams, J.M.G., Demyttenaere, K., Sabbe, B., Pieters, G., & 
Eelen, P. (2006). Is overgeneral autobiographical memory an isolated memory 
phenomenon in major depression? Memory, 14, 584 – 594. 
 
  72 
Raes, F., Hermans, D., Williams, J.M.G., & Eelen, P. (2007). A sentence completion 
procedure as an alternative to the Autobiographical Memory Test for assessing 
overgeneral memory in non-clinical populations. Memory, 15, 495 – 507. 
 
Raes, F., Hermans, D., Williams, J.M.G., Geypen, L., & Eelen, P. (2006). The effect of 
overgeneral autobiographical memory retrieval on rumination. Psychologica 
Belgica, 46, 131 – 141.  
 
Raes, F., Verstraeten, K. Bijttebier, P., Vasey, M.W., & Dalgleish, T. (2010). Inhibitory 
control mediates the relationship between depressed mood and overgeneral 
memory recall in children. Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 
39, 276 – 281. 
 
Raes, F., Watkins, E.R., Williams, J.M.G., Hermans, D. (2008). Non-ruminative 
processing reduces overgeneral autobiographical memory retrieval in students. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 748 – 756. 
 
Raes, F., Williams, J.M.G, & Hermans, D. (2009). Reducing cognitive vulnerability to 
depression: A preliminary investigation of Memory Specificity Training (MEST) 
in inpatients with depression symptomatology. Journal of Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry, 40, 24 – 38. 
 
Rekart, K.N., Mineka, S., Zinbarg, R.E. (2006). Autobiographical memory in dysphoric 
and non-dysphoric college students using a computerized version of the AMT. 
Cognition and Emotion, 20, 506 – 515. 
 
Ridout, N., Dritschel, B., Matthews, K., & O’Carroll, R. (2016). Autobiographical 
memory specificity in response to verbal and pictorial cues in clinical depression. 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 51, 109 – 115. 
 
Ridout, N., Matharu, M., Sanders, E., & Wallis, D.J. (2015). The influence of eating 
psychopathology on autobiographical memory specificity and psychopathlogy. 
Psychiatry Research, 228, 295 – 303.  
 
Romero, N., Vasquez, C., & Sanchez, A. (2014). Rumination and specificity of 
autobiographical memory in dysphoria. Memory, 22, 646 – 654. 
 
Rueger, S.Y. & George, R. (2017). Indirect effects of attributional style for positive 
events on depressive symptoms through self-esteem during early adolescence. 
Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 46, 701 – 708. 
 
Schönfeld, S. & Ehlers, A. (2006). Overgeneral memory extends to pictorial retrieval 
cues and correlates with cognitive features in posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Emotion, 6, 611 – 621.  
  73 
 
Schoofs, H. Hermans, D., Griffith, J.W., & Raes, F. (2013) Self-discrepancy and reduced 
autobiographical memory specificity in ruminating students and depressed 
patients. Cognition and Emotion, 27, 245 – 262.  
 
Serrano, J.P., Latorre, J.M., Gatz, M., & Montanes, J. (2004). Life review therapy using 
autobiographical retrieval practice for older adults with depressive 
symptomatology. Psychology and Aging, 19, 272 – 277. 
 
Spinhoven, P. Bockting, C.L.H., Kremers, I.P., Schene, A.H., & Williams, J.M.G. 
(2007). The endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes is associated with an impaired 
retrieval of  specific autobiographical memories in response to matching cues. 
Memory, 15, 324 – 338. 
 
Strauss, E., Sherman, E.M.S., & Spreen, O. (2006). A compendium of neuropsychological 
tests: Administration, norms, and commentary (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Stephens, E., Braid, A., & Hertel, P.T. (2013). Suppression-induced reduction in the 
specificity of autobiographical memories. Clinical Psychological Science, 1, 163 
– 169. 
 
Sumner, J.A. (2012). The mechanisms underlying overgeneral autobiographical memory: 
An evaluative review of evidence for the CaR-FA-X model. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 32, 34 – 48.  
 
Sumner, J.A., Griffith, J.W., & Mineka, S. (2010). Overgeneral autobiographical memory 
as a predictor of the course of depression: A meta-analysis. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 48, 614 – 625. 
 
Sumner, J.A., Griffith, J.W., & Mineka, S. (2011). Examining the mechanisms of 
overgeneral autobiographical memory: Capture and rumination, and impaired 
executive control. Memory, 19(2), 169 – 183. 
 
Sutherland, K. & Bryant, R.A. (2007). Rumination and overgeneral autobiographical 
memory. Behavior Research and Therapy, 45, 2407 – 2416. 
 
Sutherland, K. & Bryant, R.A. (2008). Social problem solving and autobiographical 
memory in posttraumatic stress disorder. Behavior Research and Therapy, 46, 
154 – 161. 
 
Swan, G.E. & Carmelli, D. (2002). Evidence for genetic mediation for executive control: 
A study of aging male twins. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 57(2), 133 – 143. 
  74 
 
Travers, K.M., Creed, P.A., & Morrissey, S. (2015). The development and initial 
validation of a new scale to measure explanatory style. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 81, 1- 6. 
 
Treynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination reconsidered: A 
psychometric analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 247 – 256. 
 
Valentino, K., Bridgett, D.J., Hayden, L.C., & Nuttall, A.K. (2012). Abuse, depressive 
symptoms, executive functioning, and overgeneral memory among a psychiatric 
sample of children and adolescents. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent 
Psychology, 41, 491 – 498. 
 
Valentino, K., Nuttall, A.K., Comas, M., McDonnell, C.G., Piper, B., Thomas, T.E., & 
Fanuele, S. (2014). Mother-child reminiscing and autobiographical memory 
specificity among preschool-age children. Developmental Psychology, 50, 1197 – 
1207. 
 
van Minnen, A., Wessel, I., Verhaak, C., & Smeenk, J. (2005). The relationship between 
autobiographical memory specificity and depressed mood following a stressful 
life event: A prospective study. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, 405 – 
415. 
 
Weathers, F.W., Litz, B.T., Keane, T.M., Palmieri, P.A., Marx, B.P., & Schnurr, P.P. 
(2013). The PTSD checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5). Retrieved from 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov. 
 
Wessel, I., Postma, I.R., Huntjens, R.J.C., Crane, C., Smets, J., Zeeman, G.G., & 
Barnhofer, T. (2014). Differential correlates of autobiographical memory 
specificity to affective and self-discrepant cues. Memory, 22, 655 – 668. 
 
Whitmer, A.J. & Banich, M.T. (2007). Inhibition versus switching deficits in different 
forms of rumination. Psychological Science, 18, 546 – 553. 
 
Williams, J.M.G. (2006). Capture and rumination, functional avoidance and executive 
control (CaRFAX): Three processes that underlie overgeneral memory. Cognition 
and Emotion, 20, 548 – 568. 
 
Williams, J.M.G., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C., Hermans, D., Raes, F., Watkins, E., & 
Dalgliesh, T. (2007). Autobiographical memory specificity and emotional 
disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 122 – 148. 
 
Williams, J.M.G. & Broadbent, K. (1986). Autobiographical memory in suicide 
attempters. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95(2), 144 – 149. 
  75 
 
Williams, J.M.G., Ellis, N.C., Tyers, C., Healy, H., Rose, G., & MacLeod, A.K. (1996). 
The specificity of autobiographical memory and imageability of the future. 
Memory & Cognition, 24, 116 – 125. 
 
 
